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THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA (1997): REAL CHANGE OR RHETORIC?
Ian Dobinsonf
Abstract: The 1997 Criminal Law supposedly heralds the beginning of a new era
in Chinese jurisprudence and criminal justice. There are doubts, however, over the
degree to which the revisions are substantial or symbolic. On the one hand, it can be
argued that by making the criminal justice system more rational and predictable, China is
moving much closer to the "rule of law" as that term is understood in the West. On the
other, it can be argued that the changes are mainly illusory and that, underneath the
veneer of rhetoric, China's criminal justice system remains a crude and arbitrary tool of
state control over enemies both real and imagined. This Article considers the competing
viewpoints and argues that the latter comes closer to the truth. Of course, even a shift in
rhetoric can have important consequences and the author acknowledges that the true
import of the 1997 Criminal Law will only be known with the passage of time.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 1, 1997, a dramatically revised version of the Criminal
Law ("CL") 1 took effect in the People's Republic of China ("China" or
"PRC"). The new law marked a significant departure from the previous
version of the Criminal Law enacted in 1979, enumerating 250 criminal
offenses not included in the 1979 version. In addition, the 1997 CL
reclassified "counterrevolution offenses" as "offenses endangering national
security," abolished the analogy provisions in the 1979 CL, and gave
explicit recognition to the principles of legality and equality:
Even though it took thirty years for the PRC to promulgate its
first criminal code and then another seventeen years to revise it,
the 1997 Criminal Code is relatively complete, uniform and
reasonable. This criminal code should not only improve the
Chinese criminal justice system, but also help China bring the
country under [the] Rule of Law.2
Lin and Keith are somewhat more cautious about the long-term effects
of the changes, but they are still quite positive about the reforms. In
commenting on the 1997 CL, they note that "the current trend is remarkable
in its reiterated support for the rational importance of predictability and the
1 See LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS COMM'N OF THE STANDING COMM. OF THE NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONGRESS
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1987) [hereinafter
LAWS OF THE PRC]. All Laws, Decisions and Supplementary Provisions cited in this article since 1979 are
taken from the relevant volumes of THE LAWS OF THE PRC. The first volume included laws enacted from
1979-1982. For all subsequent footnotes relating to Chinese law, consult the relevant volume of this
collection by date of adoption.
2 WEI LUO, THE 1997 CRIMINAL CODE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 21 (1998).
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procedural protection of non-state interests through the adaptation to
principles such as equality before the law, 'no crime, without law' and 'no
punishment without crime."
3
The "current trend" that Lin and Keith refer to includes the 1996
Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL"), but it could also be said to include the
Administrative Penalty Law (1996), the Judges Law (1995), the Procurators
Law (1995) and the Police Law (1995). 4 The 1996 CPL, for example,
significantly amended the 1979 CPL and introduced a number of pre-trial
provisions for the protection of those being investigated for crimes as well as
for those subsequently charged with such crimes. This includes restrictions
on pre-trial detention and the right to legal representation. It is also
suggested, although somewhat debatable,5 that the 1996 CPL 6 establishes the
presumption of innocence as a principle in Chinese legal theory. In
commenting on this, Chen cites a Chinese scholar who states, "'A just law
does not guarantee the justice of law.' The adoption of many of the western
practices, e.g., the presumption of innocence, etc., requires the change of
approach and thinking of judicial personnel.
' 7
For many in China, however, the reforms since 1995 demonstrate
significant progress towards the adoption of a rule of law,8 if not proof that it
has already been put in place. This view was further entrenched when, in his
report to the Party on September 12, 1997, Jiang Zemin put forward in his
now quite famous policy formulation on "running the country according to
the law and establishing a socialist rule of law country." 9  Jiang later
expanded on this formulation by stating:
To safeguard the dignity of the Constitution and other laws, we
must see to it that all people are equal before the law and no
individual or organisations shall have the privilege to overstep
it. All government organs must perform their official duties
according to the law and guarantee the citizens' rights in real
3 Lin Zhiqui & Ronald Keith, The Changing Substantive Principles of Chinese Criminal Law, 13
CHINA INFO 76, 78-79 (1998).
4 See relevant volumes of LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
5 JONATHAN HECHT, LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, OPENING TO REFORM? AN
ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S REVISED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW (1996).
6 Article 12 of the 1996 CPL states: "No person shall be found guilty without being judged as such
by a People's Court according to law." See LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
Jianfu Chen, A Moderate Step in the Right Direction-The Revision of the Criminal Procedure
Law in the PRC, 3 J. CHINESE & COMP. L. 1, 157 (1997).
8 Li Buyun, Ideal and Reality of the Rule of Law in China, 3 J. CHINESE & COMP. L. 1, 40-59
(1997).
9 Lin & Keith, supra note 3, at 84.
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earnest by instituting a system of responsibility for law
enforcement and a system of assessment and examination.10
Jiang's policy formulation was observed1' to have elevated the rule of
law to a new level of Party policy, possibly equal to the policy on the
creation of a socialist market economy. It was also seen to have ended the
debate on the merits of rule by law as opposed to the rule of law. In March
1999, Jiang's policy formulation was included in the amendment to Article 5
of the Constitution.
A contrary view, however, is that the principle changes in both the
1996 CPL and 1997 CL are merely part of Chinese rhetoric on legal reform,
and that what is occurring is not a real change in course, but a more subtle
variant of the continuation of state instrumentalism. The crackdown on the
Falun Gong may support such a view. Some Chinese academics outside of
China have also been critical of the 1997 CL. Chen,12 for example, sees the
superficial change from counterrevolutionary offenses to crimes endangering
national security, the maintenance of the artificial distinction between
administrative sanctions and crimes, and the continued use of the death
penalty as major disappointments. The fact that the 1997 CL made no
changes to the number of offenses, carrying the death penalty, as well as the
continued reliance on severe punishment, may also demonstrate continuity
in approach rather than any real change. Lin and Keith, for example, note:
"In view of the significant and positive changes elsewhere in the 1997 CL,
the increased stipulation of severe punishment in the 1997 CL for the
explicit purpose of social control by the state is a paradox."' 13
The objective of this Article is to assess whether changes introduced
by the 1997 CL are merely symbolic rather than substantial. Such an
assessment requires a detailed review of criminal law in China since the
People's Republic was established. The Article therefore begins by tracing
the history of Chinese criminal law from 1949 to 1997 in Part II. Part III
discusses the 1997 reforms in some detail, outlining the major changes in the
law compared to the provisions of the 1979 CL. Part IV examines changes
to the criminal law since 1997 and the application of the 1997 CL against
members of the Falun Gong religious movement. An important aspect of
0 Id.
1 Jiang Zemin, Hold High the Great Banner ofDeng Xiaoping Theory, 41 BEUING REv. 10, 24 (Oct.
6-12, 1997).
12 JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF CHINESE LAW, ITS NATURE AND
DEVELOPMENT (1999).
13 Lin & Keith, supra note 3, at 98.
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Chinese criminal law is the dichotomy drawn between crime and
administrative penalties, which is discussed in Part V. Finally, Part VI
concludes that while there has been major change in the criminal law, there
has been little change in fundamental principles that form the basis for the
interpretation and application of the criminal law in China.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Although Chinese legal history is quite ancient, Chinese historians
argue that the Chinese legal system as it currently exists has little connection
to the past. This conforms with the Marxist/Leninist approach to Chinese
history by PRC historians of dividing the history of China prior to the
twentieth century into three periods: primitive society (before the twenty-
first century B.C.); slave society (between twenty-first century and 476
B.C.); and feudal society (between 475 B.C. and A.D. 1840). 14 The period
from 1840 to 1949 appears to be classified in a variety of ways, including
not only capitalist or bourgeois, but also semi-feudal and colonial.
A. Chinese Criminal Law 1949-1976
The period from 1949 to 1976 is viewed by some as having only
limited relevance to the current legal system. "The present legal system is,
however, mainly a product of legal efforts in the 1980s and '90s. Thus the
pre-1949 experience of communist justice is more relevant in explaining the
lawlessness in the first thirty years of the PRC than the present legal
developments. ' 5
The first step undertaken by the new PRC government in 1949 was
the abolition of the laws and legal system of the Nationalist (Kuomintang)
Government. Consequently, during the years, 1949 to 1953, China
proceeded without the benefit of a codified legal system. The interim legal
regime was based on "the policies of the Communist Party and various
fundamental principles, laws, decrees resolutions issued by the People's
Government and the People's Liberation Army."' 6 In practice, this meant
that the law conformed to the decrees of Mao Zedong.
14 ALBERT CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 7
(2d ed. 1999).
15 J. CHEN, supra note 12, at 31.
16 See A. CHEN, supra note 14, at 24 (Item 5 of the Instructions on the Abolition of the Collection of
the Six Laws of the Kuomintang, Feb. 1949).
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
The years 1949 to 1976, however, were not devoid of legislation, and
a number of draft criminal codes (as well as other laws) were prepared. In
1951, for example, the Regulations for the Punishment of
Counterrevolutionaries were promulgated.17 Of the provisions, two stand
out. Article 16 contained the principle of crime by analogy, while Article 18
made the Regulations retroactive, thus reaching acts committed prior to
1949.18 This was consistent with the view that the law was principally to be
used as a weapon against the enemies of the state.19
The criminal law of this era was used as an instrument of suppression
in order to control the masses and reinforce the Communist regime. The
Party sought initially to ensure that all sources of political opposition were
crushed:
Indeed, it was emphasised by some CPC [Communist Party of
China] leaders that law was "an extension of military force,"
being subordinate to politics and that judicial tasks were
equivalent to those of the army and the police. It was also
emphasised that during the transitional period (from New
Democracy to Socialism) . . . it was impossible to make such
fundamental laws as a civil code and a criminal code.2°
Following this period of consolidation, work on drafting a new
criminal code began in 1954, with the introduction of the First Five-Year
Plan.21 At this time, the Chinese leaders decided to adopt a legal system
based on the Soviet model.22 To that end, many Soviet laws and legal texts
were translated into Chinese.23 Additionally, academic exchanges between
China and the U.S.S.R. thrived as China both invited Soviet scholars to
teach and sent its own students to study the Soviet system firsthand.24 The
Soviet influence was pronounced in the initial drafts of the CL and CPL.25
7 For a detailed discussion of the period from 1949 to 1965, see LENG SHAO-CHUAN, JUSTICE IN
COMMUNIST CHINA: A SURVEY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (1967).
18 Id.
19 A. CHEN, supra note 14, at 25.20 j. CHEN, supra note 12, at 37.
2 Chin Kim notes, however, that work had begun earlier in 1950 with the publication of the "Draft
of the General Outline of the Criminal Law" and the "Draft of the Leading Principles of the Criminal Law."
See CHIN KIM, THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1 (1982).
22 A. CHEN, supra note 14, at 26.23 J. CHEN, supra note 12, at 38.
24 id.
25 id.
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During the years 1956 to 1957 an important treatise on the principles
of Chinese criminal law and procedure was published. The Lectures, or
Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo hsing-fa tsung-tse chiang-I, constituted the
principal Chinese Communist treatise on criminal law and procedure
available in the non-Communist world.26
Regarding the definition of crime, the authors of the Lectures stated:
"[W]e may describe the concept of crime in the criminal law of our country
as follows: all acts which endanger the people's democratic system of our
country, undermine the social order, or are socially dangerous and,
according to law, should be subject to criminal punishment are crimes.
27
The Lectures provide important insight into the early ideology of the
criminal law. As far as the causes of crime are concerned, a quite traditional
Marxist explanation was adopted. Capitalism was viewed as one of the
major causes of crime.28 The extent to which China suffered from high rates
of crime was initially understood in such an ideological framework with the
emphasis on crimes of counterrevolution and the categorization of criminals
as enemies of the state. This was again reflected in the Lectures:
The criminal law of our country mainly attacks counter-
revolutionary criminals and criminals who murder, commit
arson, steal, swindle, rape, and commit other crimes that
seriously undermine social order and socialist construction. We
must make it clear that the sharp point of our criminal law is
mainly directed at the enemies of socialism.2 9
Work on a criminal code, as well as other major initiatives, was
suspended during the anti-rightist campaign of 1957 and the "Great Leap
Forward" of 1958. 30 During the next two years, the Soviet system came
under increasing criticism. This was largely due to the increasing tension
between Mao and the Soviet Union, whose policies, after the death of Stalin,
Mao saw as revisionist.
In 1962, however, there appeared to be some relaxation of political
control in order to facilitate economic recovery following the famines from
1959 to 1961. The "Great Leap Forward" had failed and the Party
26 j. A. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1963: AN
INTRODUCTION 58 (1968).
27 Id. at 328.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 79.
30 J. CHEN, supra note 12, at 39.
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recognized the need for economic reform based on law and social order.3'
Work on a criminal code was resumed and, in 1963, the thirty-third draft CL
was completed. It was never implemented, being first interrupted between
1963 and 1965 by the so-called "Four Clean-Ups Movement," 32 and then, in
1966, by one of the darkest periods of modem Chinese history, the Cultural
Revolution. This effectively saw the collapse of the PRC legal system and
the rejection of formalized legal codes. Judges, procurators, and lawyers
were persecuted and many were arrested and imprisoned. All law schools
were closed. Anarchy was praised and the Soviet legal system was attacked.
This period of legal chaos, although largely over by 1970, did not really end
until the death of Mao and the arrest of the "Gang of Four" in 1976.
Thereafter began a period of reform, which saw the re-establishment and
expansion of the system that existed during the 1950s.
B. Chinese Criminal Law 1976-1996
1. The End of the Cultural Revolution and the Rise ofDeng Xiaoping
The death of Mao in 1976 marked the end of the Cultural Revolution
and saw the rise of Deng Xiaoping to the position of Chairman. Two major
policies formed the basis of this period: legalization and the "Four
Modemisations." The Four Modernizations called for modernization of
industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense. The
establishment of a stable, codified legal system was seen as critical to
achieving these goals. This need for a new regime and policy direction was
initially embodied in the 1978 Constitution.3 3 At the same time, calls were
being made for the codification of laws. Foster notes: "This new call for
codification was to be taken up again in October 1978 with the republication
of Dong Biwu's 1957 codification speech and accompanying explanatory
note."
34
This led to a reconsideration of the draft codes that were already in
existence, including the thirty-third (1963) draft of the Criminal Law. On
November 29, 1978, the Standing Committee adopted a resolution declaring
that many pieces of legislation enacted in the 1950s and 1960s were to
remain in effect unless they were inconsistent with the new Constitution or
31 id.
32 Id. at 40.
33 See id. at 40-43 for a more detailed discussion.
34 F. H. Foster, Codification in China, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 399 (1982).
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had been replaced by more recent laws.35 On July 1, 1979, the Second
Session of the Fifth National People's Congress ("NPC") passed the
Criminal Law. At the same time, the NPC also promulgated the Criminal
Procedure Law, the Organic Law of the People's Courts, and the Organic
Law of the People's Procuratorate.
Prior to the effective date of the 1979 CL, a widespread media
campaign was launched to educate the people about the content and
importance of the new CL.36 As part of this campaign the Central People's
Broadcasting Station presented a series of lectures. 37 In the first lecture the
ideological foundation of the CL was made clear: "China's Criminal Law is
the embodiment of the will of the proletariat and the broad masses of people.
It is a sharp weapon with which to attack the enemy, punish criminals and
protect the people. It is an important tool for realising the dictatorship of the
proletariat." 38  Article 28 of the Constitution also stated: "The state
maintains public order and suppresses treasonable and other counter-
revolutionary activities; it penalises criminal activities that endanger public
security and disrupt the socialist economy as well as other criminal
activities; and it punishes and reforms criminals.
39
This underlying legal function appeared in other legislation. Article 3
of the Organic Law of the People's Courts entrusted the courts, when trying
criminal cases, with safeguarding the system of the dictatorship of the
proletariat and maintaining the socialist legal system and public order.40 In
addition the courts were obliged to "ensure the smooth progress of the
socialist revolution and socialist construction in the country."' Similarly,
Article 4 of the Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates, provided for the
prosecution of offenses "so as to safeguard the unification of the country, the
system of proletariat dictatorship and the socialist legal system ... and to
ensure the smooth progress of socialist modernization. 42
35 Tao-Tai Hsia & W. I. Zeldon, Recent Legal Developments in the People's Republic of China, 28
HARv. INT'L L.J. 2, 259 (1987).
36 See generally Lectures on the Criminal Law, translated in CHINESE L. & GOV'T, Summer 1980
[hereinafter Lectures on the Criminal Law].
37 id.
38 Id. at 6.
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2. The 1979 Criminal Law43
The 1979 CL adopted a structure similar to criminal codes
elsewhere.44 It consisted of 192 articles divided into two parts: Part I,
which expressed general principles of crime and punishment; and Part II,
which defined specific offenses. Because the 1979 CL was substantially
based on the 1963 draft code, many of its provisions were in accordance
with the 1926 and 1960 Soviet Criminal Codes.45
The political nature of the CL was clearly represented in its
objectives. Article 1 stated that the guiding ideology of the CL was
"Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought." The policy was to combine
punishment with leniency "in light of the actual circumstances and concrete
experiences of the people of all China's nationalities in carrying out the
people's democratic, led by the proletariat and based on the worker-peasant
alliance, that is, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and in conducting the
socialist revolution and socialist construction."
Another important provision in the 1979 CL was Article 79. This
article contained analogy provisions whereby crimes that were not expressly
defined in the CL "may be determined and punished according to whichever
article . . . that covers the most closely analogous crime." Judgments
applying this provision had to be approved by the Supreme Court. The
adoption of Article 79 was said to give flexibility to the CL even though the
46legislation was supposed to be quite comprehensive. It soon became
evident, however, that many of the provisions were vague and ambiguous.
This led to an ongoing process of supplementation in the form of Standing
Committee Decisions and Supplementary Provisions as well as Supreme
Court interpretations. As early as 1981, for example, the Standing
Committee passed its Decision Regarding the Handling of Criminals
Undergoing Reform Through Labor and Persons Undergoing Rehabilitation
Through Labor Who Escape and Commit New Crimes.47
43 id.
44 See, e.g., the Codes of the then USSR, Japan and Germany.
4' H.J. Berman et al., A Comparison of the Chinese and Soviet Codes of Criminal Law and
Procedure, 73 J. CRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 238-58 (1982). The 1979 CL contained crimes of
counterrevolution even though the Soviets had abolished such offenses in favor of crimes against state
securit in 1958.
i J. CHEN, supra note 12, at 172.
47 LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
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3. The Trial of the Gang of Four4 8
In November and December of 1980, Mao's widow and other top
Government and Party officials went on trial for alleged crimes committed
during the Cultural Revolution. The charges against the accused included
various counterrevolutionary offenses under Chapter I of the 1979 CL. The
Gang of Four was blamed for virtually all of the destruction caused by the
Cultural Revolution. This included the cessation of the drafting of a
criminal code in 1963. The Radio Lectures in 1980 made the following
comment:
Then, however, because of a change in the situation, plus the
influence of a wave of legal nihilism, and especially because of
the disruption and destruction wrought by Lin Biao and the
"Gang of Four," the work of formulating China's Criminal Law
was once again put on the shelf.
49
It was further reported that it was only after "smashing the Gang of
Four" that work could be resumed on drafting a CL as well as other
important legislation. 0 The trial of the Gang of Four in 1980 was a very
important event for the Chinese government. Apart from allowing them to
place the blame for the Cultural Revolution on certain individuals, it allowed
the Chinese to demonstrate that the lawlessness of the Cultural Revolution
was over and that a period of law and order based on specific legislation was
now beginning. It also provided an opportunity to showcase the new CL and
CPL. The Chinese government did not see anything wrong in the retroactive
use of the 1979 CL. In response to considerable criticism from Western
observers, 51 the Chinese sought to justify such retroactivity on the grounds
that it was an exercise of the "principle of leniency," whereby a person can
be tried by a new law if the punishment stipulated by the previous law was
more severe than that in the new law. International precedent was cited, but
what was not explained was what the previous law was and, therefore, what
crimes had been committed. It also appeared from comments made prior to
the trial that the defendants were already seen as guilty and the only
48 There were in fact ten defendants.
Lectures on the Criminal Law, supra note 36, at 9.
o Id.
5' See, e.g., Timothy A. Gellatt, The People's Republic of China and the Presumption of Innocence,
73 J. CR[t. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 1,259-316 (1982).
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consideration was the extent of their punishment.52 The procedure adopted
at the trial appeared to demonstrate a clear rejection of the presumption of
innocence. In commenting on this, Wang Hanbin, then Vice Chairman and
Secretary General of the Commission of Legislative Affairs, stated:
Different countries have different legal systems. . . When
instituting law, we must refer to and absorb that part of laws of
other countries which is useful to us and absorb a good part of
our own law from the past. However, in judicial work, such as
the present trial, . . we can only act in accordance with the law
currently in effect in our country.
53
Chinese criminal procedure, it was said, "does not presume anything-it
'seeks truth from facts.' 54
The trial, however, was mainly an exercise for the benefit of the
general population. It allowed the Chinese to demonstrate, at least in
principle, that nobody was above the law. In commenting on the trial, Foster
notes:
Its primary purpose was educational. Through extensive media
coverage, the trial gave the masses a concrete demonstration of
the new Chinese socialist legal system in practice and its
applicability to even the highest officials .... The trial had as
its related secondary goal the focusing of worldwide attention
on China's legalisation drive. 5
5
4. The Anti-Crime Campaigns
The appearance of a stable legal system was seen as a priority in order
to attract foreign investment, but there was also a need to ensure stability
within the community itself. This led to two approaches. The first was a
crackdown on dissent. Rights, such as freedom of speech, which had been
guaranteed by the 1978 Constitution, were significantly restricted by the
changes introduced as part of the 1982 Constitution.56 Article 90 of the
52 Id.
53 Foster, supra note 34, at 407 n.75.
54 Gellatt, supra note 51, at 261.
55 Foster, supra note 34, at 407-08.
56 Article 51 of the 1982 Constitution states that persons exercising their rights "may not infringe
upon the interests of the state, of society or of the collective." See LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
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1979 CL also declared that a crime of counterrevolution was any act "with
the aim of overthrowing the political power of the dictatorship of the
proletariat and the socialist system and endangers the People's Republic of
China." All anti-Party views were severely dealt with and extensive use was
made of "re-education through labor."
The second approach was to streamline the criminal legal system.
China's crime rate was also high and the new legal system was incapable of
reducing it.57 From the middle of 1981, new Standing Committee Decisions
were introduced to streamline the system, the effect being, in most cases, to
simply bypass a number of the provisions of the CPL. The earliest of these
Decisions were the Decision Regarding the Handling of Criminals
Undergoing Reform Through Labor and Persons Undergoing Rehabilitation
Through Labor Who Escape or Commit New Crimes in 1981 and the
Decision Regarding the Severe Punishment of Criminals Who Seriously
Sabotage the Economy in 1982.58 The effect of both was to significantly
increase the penalties for escapees, recidivists, and those who committed
offenses under thirteen articles of the CL. 59 Such offenses included
speculation, drug trafficking and corruption. These Decisions made the
death penalty available for such offenses. In 1981, the Standing Committee
also passed the Decision Regarding Approval of Cases Involving the Death
Penalty, which allowed Higher People's Courts to order the death penalty
without the need for approval by the Supreme Court. 60 In 1983, the
government turned its attention to the serious problem of violent crime by
passing the Decision Regarding the Severe Punishment of Criminals Who
Seriously Endanger Public Security. 61 Linked to this was the Decision
Regarding the Procedure for Prompt Adjudication of Cases Involving
Criminals Who Seriously Endanger Public Security, which allowed the
courts and procuratorates to circumvent the requirements of the 1979 CPL.
These Decisions began the process of supplementation that was to
continue for the next fourteen years and which included nineteen further
Decisions and Supplementary Provisions. These Decisions also increased
the maximum penalty for many offenses to the death penalty. The
maximum penalty for regular smuggling under Article 118 of the 1979 CL,
for example, was increased from ten years imprisonment to death.
5' Donald C. Clarke, Note, Concepts Of Law In The Chinese Anti-Crime Campaign, 98 HARv. L.
REv. 1890, 1896 (1985).
58 LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
5' For a list of these Articles, see the Appendix to the 1982 Decision.
60 LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.61 Id.
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The 1982 and 1983 Decisions were heavily criticized in and outside
China because they breached the principle of non-retroactivity. Article 9 of
the 1979 CL stated that the CL was to enter into force on January 1, 1980.
Acts committed after 1949, but before January 1, 1980, which were not
criminal at the time, could not be prosecuted, whereas the lesser punishment
was to apply to acts that were criminal both before and after January 1,
1980. 61 If the 1979 CL did not make such an act a crime, then the CL would
also apply.63 The vagueness of the law before 1980 made it quite easy to
conclude that criminal acts committed before this date were covered by the
1979 CL. The trial of the Gang of Four is ample evidence of this. The
increases in penalty and the 1982 and 1983 Decisions, however, not only
breached the principle of non-retroactivity, but also the principle that the law
to be applied should be that which imposes the lesser penalty. Section 4(2)
of the 1982 Decision was specifically retroactive:
In cases of crimes committed before the date of implementation
of this Decision, if an offender voluntarily surrenders before
May 1, 1982 or, if having already been arrested, he truthfully
confesses all his crimes . . . and in addition brings truthful
accusations with respect to the crimes of other criminals, he
shall be dealt with in accordance with the relevant provisions of
the law before the implementation of this Decision. In cases
where the offender, before May 1, 1982, continues to conceal
the crimes he has committed, . . . he shall be taken as
continuing to commit crimes and shall be dealt with in
accordance with this Decision.
The 1983 Decision, subsequent Decisions, and Supplementary
Decisions were not explicitly retroactive, but in practice the approach was
the same. In fact, Standing Committee Decisions such as that in 1983 could
be viewed as even harsher than the 1982 Decision as they did not contain the
provisions relating to voluntary surrender, and therefore, the option for an
offender to take advantage of the lesser penalty before the enactment of the
Decision.
While there are no official figures available, it is believed that tens of
thousands were executed as part of this anti-crime campaign. In conjunction
with these crackdowns, the Govemment launched major media campaigns,
62 See 1979 CL, art. 9, LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
63 Id.
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which often carried reports of arrests and executions. 64 Other newspaper
articles talked more about the need for the masses to join the fight against
the enemies of the state.
65
Various anti-crime campaigns continued after 1983 and appear to
follow a pattern of first a Standing Committee Decision then the crackdown.
In 1991, for example, as part of a crackdown on prostitution and trafficking
in women and children, the Standing Committee passed the Decision on the
Strict Prohibition of Prostitution and Whoring, and the Decision Regarding
the Severe Punishment of Criminals Who Abduct and Traffic in or Kidnap
Women or Children.66 In fact, the Standing Committee enacted twenty-two
Decisions and Supplementary Provisions during the period from 1981 to
1996.67 All twenty-two laws have been incorporated in the provisions of the
1997 CL.68
5. Decisions and Supplementary Provisions 1988-1995
From 1988 to 1995, nineteen Standing Committee Decisions and
Supplementary Provisions were passed. The legality of all of them has been
challenged. Zhao and He, for example, argued that all Standing Committee
laws directly contradicted the rule against retroactivity in the 1979 CL.6 9 All
nineteen Standing Committee Decisions and Supplementary Provisions may
also be unconstitutional. Article 67(3) of the Constitution empowers the
Standing Committee to partially supplement and amend laws when the NPC
is not in session provided that the basic principles of these laws are not
contravened. Article 5 of the Constitution also states that "[n]o laws or
administrative or local rules and regulations may contravene the
Constitution." There are no examples of any laws being invalidated by
reason of such a contravention of either the principles embodied in the 1979
CL or the Constitution itself.70 Even though the questionable legality of the
Decisions was recognized at the time, Party policy, based on the need to
fight crime, outweighed the need to conform to law and legal principles. In
commenting on this, Chen notes:
64 Clarke, supra note 57, at 1897.
65 Id. On August 27, 1983, for example, the Sichuan Daily carried an article entitled "Strike
Resolute Blows at and Thoroughly Exterminate an Evil."
LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
67 fd.
68 See 1997 CL, apps. I, II, LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
69 Lin & Keith, supra note 3, at 93.
70 See 1979 CL, arts. 62(11), 67(7)(8), 89(13), LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1. In fact, it is
arguable that all Decisions and Supplementary Provisions since the promulgation of the 1997 CL are
similarly unconstitutional.
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[T]he principle of the supremacy of state law as against the
edicts, policy documents and exhortations of the CPC and the
orders, directions and instructions of senior officials has not yet
been firmly established in constitutional theory, and, to the
extent that the principles of socialist legality have indeed been
officially affirmed verbally, they have not been fully observed
in practice. The effect of these factors has been to blur the
distinction between law and policy, and to stimulate students of
the Chinese legal system to reflect upon their assumptions or
definitions as to the nature of law.
7 1
Nevertheless, all the Decisions and Supplementary Provisions relevant
to the 1979 CL were very likely unconstitutional. The Supplementary
Provisions Concerning the Punishment of the Crimes of Smuggling, and the
Supplementary Provisions Concerning the Punishment of the Crimes of
Embezzlement and Bribery, both passed in 1988, supplemented not only the
CL, but also the 1982 Decision. Other Decisions and Supplementary
Provisions made no attempt at amendment or supplementation of the CL and
simply created new offenses. One of the last Standing Committee laws, the
Decision Concerning Punishment of Crimes Against the Company Law
(1995) is just one example of this process.
The piecemeal approach to the law of the 1980s and 1990s, however,
was inevitable. In commenting on this in 1978, Deng Xiaoping stated:
There is a lot of legislative work to do, and we do not have
enough trained people. Therefore, legal provisions will
inevitably be rough to start with, then gradually improved
upon.... In short, it is better to have some laws than none, and
better to have them sooner than later.72
The reforms in the 1996 CPL and 1997 CL may have remedied such
defects and, as Wei Lou puts it, resulted in law that is "relatively complete,
uniform and reasonable," 73 but the process of supplementation has
71 A. CHEN, supra note 14, at 77.
72 J. CHEN, supra note 12, at 43.
71 Luo, supra note 2, at 21.
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continued. The Supreme Court, however, has at least addressed the
principle of non-retroactivity. Article 12 states that if an act committed
before the "entry into force" of the 1997 CL "was not deemed a crime under
the laws in force at the time, then those laws shall apply .... However, if
this Law does not deem it a crime or imposes a lighter punishment, this Law
shall apply." According to the Supreme Court, this should be interpreted so
as to reflect "the principle, adopted by most countries in the world, of
applying the criminal law in effect at the time of the act but giving the lesser
punishment prescribed by the new law when it is put into effect." 7
III. THE REFORM OF THE CRIMINAL LAW AND THE 1997 CRIMINAL LAW
A. Structural Considerations
The process of reforming the 1979 CL began in 1982 with the setting
up of a review committee by the Standing Committee. In 1983, the
redrafting process came under the auspices of the Legislative Affairs
Commission of the NPC and by 1988 three drafts had been tabled and
discussed. The implementation of the rule of law and the movement from a
planned to a market economy were seen as the two driving forces behind the
76
reform process.
In 1988, the Standing Committee drew up preliminary guidelines for
the drafting of a revised CL. The events of 1989, however, were seen as not
conducive to the proper consideration of such major change,77 and further
Decisions and Supplementary Provisions were passed.78 This is particularly
significant in light of the fact that the 1988 revisions included the abolition
of the crimes of counterrevolution and their replacement by crimes against
national security. The trials of the activists in 1990 to 1991 gave China an
opportunity to again 79 demonstrate and legitimise its criminal justice system
74 See, e.g., Standing Committee Decision on Penalizing Crimes of Foreign Exchange Defrauding,
Evasion and Illegal Transaction (Dec. 29, 1998), and the Standing Committee Amendments to the CL (Dec.
26, 1999), LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
75 Zhang Jun, On Interpreting the New Criminal Law, 4 CHINA LAW 66, 67 (1997).
76 Chen Xingliang, Major Changes in the Chinese Criminal, (May 8, 1997) (paper presented at the
School of Law, City University of Hong Kong). Professor Chen was a member of the drafting team for the
1997 CL.
77 Wang Hanbin, Explanations on the Draft Revision of the Criminal Law of the PRC (Mar. 6, 1997)
(speech delivered to the NPC).
71 Supplementary Provisions Regarding Punishing Crimes of Counterfeiting Registered Trademarks
(1993) and Decision on Punishment of Crimes Disrupting Financial Order (1995). See LAWS OF THE PRC,
supra note 1
79 The other opportunity occurred in 1981 with the trial of the "Gang of Four." Like that trial, the
trials of the pro-democracy activists that followed Tiananmen were seen as "show trials." For an analysis
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to the outside world, but these trials might have been very different had a
revised CL already been in place. By relying on the provisions of the 1979
CL, the government was also able to emphasize the principle of combining
punishment with leniency. Consequently, the vast majority of students who
took part in the anti-government movement were distinguished from the
ringleaders based on Mao's theory of "antagonistic and non-antagonistic
contradictions." Antagonistic contradictions focused on those who were
class enemies and emphasized the severe punishment of those who sought to
overthrow the state. The ringleaders had accordingly committed acts which
were antagonistic contradictions and the retention and application of
counterrevolutionary offenses was, therefore, essential for the purposes of
prosecuting such offenders. Those who had been "misled and manipulated"
were guilty of non-antagonistic contradictions and therefore could be offered
leniency in the form of administrative sanctions.
Two laws and one Decision passed by the Standing Committee after
Tiananmen are of interest in considering the policy of this time.80 The first
was the Law on Assemblies, Processions and Demonstrations, 1989.81
Chapter II of this Law set out the provisions for obtaining permission for
holding assemblies, processions or demonstrations. In Chapter IV, Legal
Responsibility, Article 29(3) states that the holding of an assembly,
procession or demonstration where there has been no application, permission
has not been granted, or the gathering is conducted contrary to the
specifications of the permission and public order is seriously undermined,
then those directly responsible for the assembly, procession or
demonstration shall be liable under Article 158 of the 1979 CL. The
maximum penalty under Article 15882 was five years imprisonment. In
commenting on this, Findlay and Chiu state: "Through an analysis of recent
public order legislation in the PRC it is possible to recognise the reliance on
legality as a legitimator for a battery of social control mechanisms, more
than to simply indict the law itself as a means of repression." 83 According to
Findlay and Chiu, such laws reflect an approach to legality based very much
on policies of state instrumentalism.
of this issue soon after Tiananmen, see M. Findlay, Show Trials in China: After Tiananmen Square, 16 J.L.
Soc'Y 3, 352-59 (1989).
go It is not suggested that these laws were enacted solely because of Tiananmen, but that the events
leading up to June 4, 1989, and the aftermath would have obviously affected policy at the time and,
therefore, the usefulness of such legislation.
81 LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
82 1979 CL, art. 158, LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
83 M. Findlay & T. Chiu Chor-Wing, Constitutional Rights and the Constraint of Populist Dissent:
Recent Resort to Legalism in China, 19 INT'L J. SOCIOLOGY L. 67, 80 (1991).
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The second enactment was the Law on the National Flag. Article I
of this Law stated: "This Law is enacted in accordance with the Constitution
with a view to defending the dignity of the National Flag, enhancing
citizens' consciousness of the State and promoting the spirit of patriotism."
Article 19 also provided for an administrative penalty of fifteen days'
detention for anyone who desecrated the National Flag. On the same day,
however, the Standing Committee issued its Decision Regarding the
Punishment of the Crimes of Desecrating the National Flag and the National
Emblem of the PRC.85 This Decision made it a crime punishable up to a
maximum of three years imprisonment for anyone who publicly and wilfully
burnt, mutilated, scrawled on, defiled or trampled on the National Flag or
Emblem.
The reform process was put back on track in 1993, and in March 1994,
the Legislative Affairs Commission tabled the Collection of Articles in the
Specific Provisions of the Criminal Law. At the same time, several scholars,
including some from Renmin University,86 were asked to draft the General
Provisions. In commenting on the reform process, two members of the
drafting committee stated: "The guiding principle for the reform has been
clear: a new criminal law should serve economic restructuring rather than
politics; and it should be democratic, scientific and consistent with
international standards. 8 7
The driving forces behind the reform process were the implementation
of the rule of law and the development of Deng's "socialist market
economy." These two factors, however, were inexorably linked and this was
clearly demonstrated in 1997 by the policy statements that "the market
economy is a rule of law economy" and "govern[s] the country according to
law and mak[esj it a socialist country ruled by law."
88
In 1996, a new draft code of the criminal law was before the NPC.
After considerable debate and some amendment, the revised CL was finally
enacted on March 14, 1997. Although there had been considerable input
from Chinese legal scholars since 1989, the drafters of the 1997 CL decided
to follow the 1988 guidelines:
84 Law of the Peoples Republic of China on the National Flag (1990), LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note
1.
s5 The Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Regarding the
Punishment of Crimes of Desecrating the National Flag and the National Emblem of the People's Republic
of China (1990), LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
86 This group of scholars included Zhao Bingzhi, Bao Suixian, and He Xingwang.
87 Zhao Bingzhi & Bao Suixian, The Present and Future of Criminal Law Reform in China, 1 J.
CHINESE COMP. L. 1, 133 (1995).
88 Lin & Keith, supra note 3, at 23-24.
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First, the revision was to incorporate various Decisions and
Supplementary Provisions issued by the NPC's Standing
Committee since 1979. Second, the revision was to ensure
continuity and stability of the Law; thus provisions without
"major" problems would not be revised. Thirdly, general and
vague provisions were to be elaborated and clarified. In short,
the revision was to rationalise, systematise, clarify and
elaborate the 1979 Law. 89
Since 1997, the process of revision has continued as the Standing
Committee has passed new laws and the CL has been amended. 9 In
addition, many of the offense provisions in the 1997 CL have been subject to
judicial clarification.
B. The 1997 Amendments to the Criminal Law
1. The Three Guiding Principles of Reform
The 1997 revision of the CL is said to be based on three principles:
unity, continuity, and clarity.9'
a. Unity
As stated, the Standing Committee enacted twenty-two separate
criminal laws from 1979 to 1997.92 Nearly 220 offenses were also created
as part of civil laws that contained criminal provisions.93 This created a total
of approximately 300 offenses. In addition, 100 completely new offenses
were added by the 1997 CL. There are a number of important aspects to the
amendment process. The most significant is the process of supplementation
that was deemed necessary to fill in the gaps of the 1979 CL and also to
provide for the criminalization of new offenses. Reviewing some of these
89 J. CHEN, supra note 12, at 170-71.
90 The Standing Committee passed the Decision on Penalizing Crimes of Foreign Exchange
Defrauding, Evasion and Illegal Transaction on Dec. 29, 1998; passed an amendment to the CL for offenses
relating to securities and futures on Dec. 26, 1999; and issued the Decision Regarding Outlawing Cult
Organizations and Punishing Cult Activities on Oct. 30, 1999.
91 Chen Xingliang, Major Changes in the Chinese Criminal (1997) (unpublished paper presented at
the School of Law, City University of Hong Kong).
92 Listed in the 1997 CL, LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
93 See, e.g., Company Law of the People's Republic of China (1993), LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note
VOL. I11 No. I
THE CRIMINAL LAW OF CHINA
supplementary laws will assist in an analysis of this process of
supplementation.
Some Standing Committee Decisions provided certain detail that was
missing from the 1979 CL. The Decision on the Prohibition Against
Narcotic Drugs (1990), for example, set out the various minimum quantities
of opium and heroin, and the different sentence ranges to be imposed.
Under Article 2, a person who smuggles, transports, or manufactures opium
of not less than 1000 grams or heroin of not less than 50 grams is subject to
a minimum of fifteen years imprisonment with a maximum of life
imprisonment or death. An offender involved in amounts of between 200 to
1000 grams of opium and 10 to 50 grams of heroin is subject to a fixed term
of seven years imprisonment. There are numerous other detailed provisions
which expand upon the elements of various drug offenses and the
punishments to be imposed.
Other Standing Committee Decisions enacted new offenses. Two
examples of this were the Decision on Punishing Crimes Violating Company
Law (1995), and the Decision on Punishing Crimes of Issuing, Making and
Illegally Selling Fake Invoices of Value-added Tax (1995). The creation of
these new offenses reflected the enormous changes in the Chinese economy
and the major increase in crime that accompanied it.
94
These Decisions and Supplementary Provisions have now been
incorporated within the 1997 CL. Appendix I of the CL specifies all
legislation which has been invalidated by virtue of its incorporation in the
1997 CL and includes, for example, the Decision on Punishing Crimes
Violating Company Law. Appendix II contains a list of legislation that
remains in force but only insofar as it relates to the administrative provisions
of those laws. Examples of this are the other two laws mentioned above:
the Decision on the Prohibition Against Narcotic Drugs (1990) and the
Decision on Punishing Crimes of Issuing, Making and Illegally Selling Fake
Invoices of Value-added Tax (1995).
Of special interest are the Decision Regarding the Severe Punishment
of Criminals Who Seriously Sabotage the Economy (1982), and the
Decision Regarding the Severe Punishment of Criminals Who Seriously
Endanger Public Security (1983). Both were introduced as part of the "Anti-
Crime Campaign" in 1983 and increased the number of offenses for which
the death penalty could be applied. These increased penalties have been
incorporated in the 1997 CL for those offenses which are the same or
94 Susan Finder & Fu Hualing, Tightening Up Chinese Courts' "'Bags"-The Amended PRC,
Criminal Law, 11 CHINA L. & PRACTICE 35,37 (1997).
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similar95 to those in the 1979 CL. The 1997 CL has, therefore, not changed
the number of offenses carrying the death penalty.
Notwithstanding the significant increase in the number of offense
provisions in the 1997 CL, it appears that this process of supplementation is
continuing. On December 29, 1998, the Standing Committee passed the
Decision on Penalizing Crimes of Foreign Exchange Defrauding, Evasion
and Illegal Transaction. 96  At the end of October 1999, however, the
Standing Committee received proposals recommending that amending the
CL was "more convenient for day-to-day implementation." 97 These
suggestions were accepted on December 26, 1999, and it was reported98 that
the Standing Committee had passed an amendment to the CL for offenses
relating to securities and futures:
According to the amendment, anyone who obtains inside
information about securities or futures dealings is prohibited to
leak the information or engage in related deals before it is
officially published. Those who violate the law face
imprisonment up to ten years and a fine of two to five times the
illegal income thus gained. 99
b. Continuity
In accordance with the Standing Committee's 1988 guidelines, only
those provisions of the 1979 CL which had major problems were to be
revised. 1° Continuity, in this regard, was applicable to the twenty-two
Standing Committee Decisions and Supplementary Provisions. This
principle also related to the numerous Interpretations that were issued by the
Supreme Court and the Supreme Procuratorate. In A Guide to the
Application of the New Criminal Law and Related Judicial Interpretations-
1997, the Supreme Court Research Office identifies those pre-1997
Interpretations which are relevant to the articles of the 1997 CL.'0 '
9' See 1997 CL, arts. 125, 151, LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
96 It is of interest to note that on January 13, 1999, the State Council passed what appear to be
parallel administrative regulations (Regulations on Punishing Violations of Monetary Law) becoming
effective on March 1, 1999.
97 Law Making Set to be Streamlined, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 26, 1999, at 2.
98 Annual NIPC Session Passes Laws, Closes, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 27, 1999, at 1.
99 Id.
100 J. CHEN, supra note 12, at 170.
"o' SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, A GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION
OF THE NEW CRIMINAL LAW AND RELATED JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS (1997).
VOL. I I No. I
THE CRIMINAL LA.W OF CHINA
An example of this is Article 17, which refers to the ages of criminal
responsibility. Generally, the age of criminal responsibility is sixteen, but a
person between the ages of fourteen and sixteen will be liable for crimes of
intentional killing, intentional injury causing serious harm or death, rape,
robbery, drug trafficking, arson, causing explosions, and poisoning. Among
others, this incorporates the Supreme Court's Interpretation Regarding Laws
Applicable to the Handling of Criminal Offenses Committed by Minors
dated February 2, 1995.102 Some Interpretations have been incorporated into
the wording of the articles, while others remain relevant for the purposes of
interpretation.
c. Clarity
The third guiding principle for the revision process was clarity. The
1979 CL contained a number of vague, general provisions. Wei Luo
suggests: "When the 1979 CL was formulated, the Chinese criminal
legislative philosophy was 'General is more appropriate than specific.'
Therefore, many provisions that related to specific offenses were very
general and ambiguous in the old criminal code. ' t 3
The drafters of the 1979 CL viewed such generality of terminology as
appropriate to the constantly changing circumstances on the mainland. This
provided justification for the inclusion of the analogy provisions in Article
79. The 1979 CL also contained three offenses-speculation, hooliganism
and dereliction of duty, 104 which were subject to very broad interpretation.
These were known in China as the "three bags" or "pocket" offenses. In
commenting on speculation under Article 118 of the 1979 CL, Finder and
Hualing observed: "It is a 'bag' which has been as big as the courts want it
to be. It includes false advertising, publishing pornographic materials,
trading in endangered species, manipulating prices, violating State
monopolies and ticket scalping."'' 5
The 1997 CL abolished this single offense and created multiple
individual offenses to cover all such activities. The details of this approach
are discussed below in Part III.B.3, Amendments to the Criminal Law-
Specific Provisions.
'02 For another example, see the Supreme Procuratorate Reply Regarding Whether a Person Between
the Age of Fourteen and Sixteen Should Be Criminally Liable for Destroying Means of Transportation,
Traffic Facilities, Electricity and Gas Facilities and Inflammable and Explosive Facilities (Apr. 8, 1995).
103 Luo, supra note 2, at 11.
'"' 1979 CL, arts. 117-19, 160, and ch. 8, LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
105 Finder & Fu, supra note 94, at 37.
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2. Amendments to the Criminal Law-General Provisions
Apart from the massive increase in the number of offense provisions,
the most important changes in the 1997 CL concern the general principles of
criminal liability. The amendments are considered under four headings: (a)
depoliticization, (b) Article 3 and nullem crimen sine lege, (c) "equality
before the law," and (d) Article 5 and "punishment must fit the crime."
a. Depoliticization
One of the most significant changes in the 1997 CL is the abolition of
the crimes of counterrevolution and their replacement by crimes endangering
national security. This, however, is just one aspect of the depoliticization of
the CL. Both Articles 1 and 2 of the 1997 CL have been amended so as to
remove certain political terms that appeared in the 1979 CL. In Article 1,
the references to Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, and the people's
democratic dictatorship led by the proletariat and based on the worker-
peasant alliance, have been removed. Article 1 now states that the purpose
of the 1997 CL is to punish crimes and protect people according to the
Constitution, "in light of the concrete experiences and actual circumstances
in China's fight against crime." In Article 2, it is no longer an aim of the CL
to "fight against all counterrevolutionary . . . acts in order to defend the
system of the dictatorship of the proletariat." These changes have also been
reflected in amendments to the Constitution.
The language of Articles 1 and 2 of the 1979 CL reflected Mao's class
theory of criminal law and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The criminal
law served as the primary tool for this dictatorship "in accordance with the
policy of combining punishment with leniency." This was further expanded
through Mao's theory of antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions,
whereby those who were guilty of antagonistic contradictions, such as
counterrevolution and crimes of serious violence, were class enemies and
should be punished very severely. Non-antagonistic contradictions were
defined as conflicts between citizens that did not threaten the dictatorship
and the socialist revolution. The harm caused could, therefore, be construed
as less serious or minor, and offenders punished accordingly. As a result, a
crime such as intentional killing (Article 132) was punishable by a relatively
light sentence of between three and ten years imprisonment instead of life
imprisonment or death. The distinction between antagonistic and non-
antagonistic contradictions was also applied to pleading. Those who pleaded
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not guilty were accordingly antagonistic. Counterrevolution reflected the
classic example of an antagonistic contradiction and the label of class
enemy.
With regard to the abolition of the offenses of "counterrevolution," it
was the use of this term in the 1979 CL that distinguished the Chinese
criminal law from other socialist criminal codes. Since 1979, these offenses
were also a major source of concern for many both in and outside China.
For those outside China, they represented the basis for much of China's
abuse of human rights, particularly when combined with reform and re-
education through labor sanctions. Within China, those involved in
reforming the criminal law also sought the abolition of these offenses due to
their incompatibility with China's economic development and open-door
policy.10 6 Almost from the date of promulgation of the 1979 CL, proposals
were put forward for the abolition of this term. While China has tended to
show considerable resistance to Western criticism, calls from within China
to abolish this term were based on its incompatibility with internationally
acceptable principles. Proposals for the abolition of the term date back to
1983 and the drafts of the CL tabled in 1988 had removed such offenses,
replacing them with "crimes endangering national security." However, the
events in 1989 put on hold the introduction of these changes. In light of the
events in 1989 and China's reaction to them, abolishing crimes of
counterrevolution was seen as contrary to the maintenance of political and
social stability. In the words of Wang Hanbin in 1997, it was inappropriate
to introduce such changes at such a time.10 7 According to Hanbin, however,
the change was appropriate in 1997, in line with the development of China's
politics, economics, and social circumstances. In March 1999, the term
"counterrevolutionary activities" was also removed from Article 28 of the
Constitution and replaced by "crimes endangering national security." 108
The primary justification for the amendment was that the term
"counterrevolution" was political. Zhao and Bao saw the crimes of
counterrevolution as political crimes and, as such, they were contrary to
international standards. They argued that the retention of such offenses
caused problems for the extradition of criminals to China because countries
would not do so where the offense is counterrevolution. They further noted
that such crimes were inconsistent with the "one country two systems"
principle as it would be impossible to reconcile activities that were lawful in
106 Lin & Keith, supra note 3, at 93-96.
107 Hanbin, supra note 77.
108 Six Amendments to the Chinese Constitution, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, (Mar. 17, 1999), at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/1999/enc_990317001002_TopNews.htm.
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Hong Kong and Macau, but which might be considered counterrevolutionary
under the 1979 CL. 109
The actual changes, however, are superficial. Many of the crimes of
counterrevolution have simply been reclassified as crimes endangering
national security. "10 Article 103, for example, makes it an offense to
"organize, plot, or act to split the country or undermine national unification,"
while Article 105 makes it an offense to "organize plot or act to subvert the
political power of the State or overthrow the socialist system." A new
offense, Article 106, has been added that also makes it a crime to collude
with a foreign institution, organization, or individual to commit crimes under
Articles 103 and 105. In his address to the NPC in March 1997, Hanbin
stated that the purpose of this article was to deal with individuals who
colluded with foreign elements for the purposes of "westernizing" or "de-
organizing" the socialist system."' The danger of westernization, he said, is
an important State security concern for China. In fact, the involvement of
foreign elements is recognized as an aggravating factor in a number of
offenses.1 2 With regard to political dissent in China, there obviously exists
significant scope for prosecution. Successful prosecution could even be
easier under the new provisions. The requirement of counterrevolutionary
purpose has simply been replaced by endangerment of national security, and
this term can be interpreted very broadly.
b. Article 3 and "nullem crimen sine lege"
As part of the rhetoric and promotion of the 1997 CL, Article 3 and
the abolition of the analogy provisions in Article 79 of the 1979 CL are said
to incorporate the principles of nullem crimen sine lege ("no crime without
law") and nulla poena sine lege ("no punishment without law"). 113 Article 3
states that only acts which are clearly defined as crimes by the law shall
carry criminal liability. This is in contrast to Article 79 of the 1979 CL,
which allowed the prosecution of behavior that was not specifically defined
as an offense in the CL, to be prosecuted under "whichever article of the
Specific Provisions of this Law that covers the most closely analogous
109 Zhao & Bao, supra note 87.
110 In fact, except for some minor changes, virtually all the previous offenses under the heading
Counterrevolutionary Crimes have been retained as Crimes of Endangering National Security. An
important exception is Article 98 of the 1979 CL, which made it an offense to organize or lead a
counterrevolutionary group. See LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
1 Hanbin, supra note 77.
112 See 1997 CL, art. 107, LAWS OFTHEPRC, supra note I.
113 LUO, supra note 2, at 34.
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crime." At the time, such provisions were viewed as necessary due to the
somewhat general approach taken in drafting of the 1979 CL. In 1982, Chin
Kim noted that the principle of nullem crimen sine lege was not strictly
implemented in the 1979 CL." 4 At the time of the deliberations on the 1979
CL, support existed for a total adoption of this principle, but this was
opposed on the basis of the need to be flexible in light of China's fast-
changing economic and social conditions. Such policy correlated with the
need to ensure political and social control. With regard to the interpretation
of counterrevolution, for example, the meaning of this term could differ
depending on the political circumstances of the time. The compromise
reached was the adoption of Article 79 with the requirement that the
Supreme Court approve the use of this article. It was this very arbitrary
nature of the 1979 CL--especially where it concerned counterrevolutionary
crimes-that resulted in the most criticism from the West.
Limited use," 5 however, was made of these provisions with most
cases involving crimes of disruption of marriage and the family." 6 Even
though it was not often used, many Chinese scholars saw Article 79 as
clearly contrary to the new spirit of law reform and the development of a
rule of law. Hungdah Chiu, for example, "pointed out that the use of
analogy in Article 79 of the 1979 CL undermined the basic spirit of the rule
of law and subsequently conflicted with the 1982 state constitution's
commitment to the rule of law."
1 7
The inclusion of Article 3 and the rejection of analogy through the
dropping of Article 79 appear, at least, to enshrine nullem crimen sine lege
and nulla poena sine lege. The greatly expanded provisions on economic
crime, as well as many other crimes, were also contrary to the principle of
crime by analogy. What was required was not flexibility and generality, but
certainty and predictability. The problem of allowing the prosecution of
crime by analogy was also compounded by the existence of unqualified legal
personnel." 8 As a result, it was necessary to move towards even greater
legalism. For those involved in drafting the 1997 CL, it was important to
separate law from state policy. Flexibility and analogy supported a legal
system based on a policy of rule by law, which reflected the existence of the
law within the workings of the State and accordingly the Party policy of the
14 KIM, supra note 21, at 13-14.
15 Between 1980 and 1989, only sixty cases were submitted to the Supreme Court for approval.
Bingzhi & Suixian, supra note 87.
116 See Chen Caigen v. Chen Caisheng, I China L. Rep. 500 (1991).
117 Lin & Keith, supra note 3, at 87-88.
11 Bingzhi & Suixian, supra note 87.
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time. This was contrary to a rule of law, which emphasized the supremacy
of law and that everyone, including the Party and the State, was required to
obey the law.'1 9
The debate concerning rule by law versus rule of law, which started in
the 1980s, reached its peak in the run up to the enactment of the 1996 CPL,
the 1997 CL, and the CPC Congress in September 1997.120 At the end of
1995 and the beginning of 1996, a series of lectures on the legal system was
presented to the Central Committee of the Party. 121 In his lecture in
February 1996, Wang Jianfu set out three points for the adoption of the rule
of law in China. These were the supremacy of law, constitutional validity,
and equality. 122 Jiang Zemin formally endorsed these points in his address
to the Party in September 1997 with his pronouncement of "running the
country according to law and establishing a socialist rule of law country." 
123
In terms of theoretical discourse, the adoption of the rule of law has
accordingly been elevated to the same level as the development of a socialist
market economy. 124 This status was confirmed in the Amendments to the
Constitution of March 1999. These included the addition of Deng Xiaoping
Theory to that of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and the addition
of a new sentence in Article 5. This new sentence states, "The People's
Republic of China practices ruling the country by law and constructs a
socialist rule of law country."
As noted earlier, Lin and Keith see the 1997 CL and the 1996 CPL as
part of "an existing trend in the rationalization of legal development."' 125 It
is probably still too early to draw any practical conclusions about the
correctness of this observation, but the recent crackdown on the Falun Gong
creates many doubts about the extent of any real change. The adoption of
nullem crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege must also be assessed in
light of the crime and administrative penalty law division. The arbitrary and
artificial distinction between these divisions based on individual liability and
punishment contradicts these two principles. This is particularly true when
it is noted that, under the Security Administration Punishment Regulations
("SAPR") 2 6 of 1986,127 detention in custody for a period of up to four years
119 Id.




'2 Id. at 84.
1 Id. at 85.
126 These regulations are also entitled Regulations of the PRC on Administrative Penalties for Public
Seu The SAPR was amended in 1994.
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is not deemed to be a criminal penalty. The maintenance of the crime/non-
crime dichotomy has also led to the retention of the use of re-education
through labor, and while this was discussed by the Criminal Law Drafting
Committee in 1996, no change was made.
128
c. "Equality before the law"
Although this principle is contained in Article 33 of the Constitution
and in Article 4 of the 1979 CPL, it did not appear in the 1979 CL; therefore,
its inclusion in Article 4 of the 1997 CL is somewhat belated. As Chen
notes, the class nature of the 1979 CL emphasized the need to distinguish
between those who were class enemies, such as counterrevolutionaries, and
those who committed less serious offenses. 129 Equality was contrary to such
an approach. Article 4, however, is a clear statement of the principle that no
one is above the law. This accords with Jiang's policy statements in 1997:
"To safeguard the dignity of the Constitution and other laws, we must see to
it that all people are equal before the law and no individuals or organizations
shall have the privilege to overstep it.'
' 30
Since passing the 1997 CL, China has, on a number of occasions,
attempted to demonstrate its commitment to this principle through the
prosecution of government and party officials. On March 8, 2000, for
example, the former deputy governor of Jiangxi Province was executed for a
series of bribery offenses committed between 1995 and 1999. He was the
highest ranking Party official to date to receive the death penalty. In
commenting on his execution, the People's Daily stated that "in socialist
China, there is no special citizen in the eyes of the law," and further noted
that "the severe punishment of Hu Changqing ... serves as a caution to the




Like nullem crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege though, the
principle of equality is questionable in light of the distinction between crime
and non-crime. Even within the 1997 CL, there appears to be inequality.
Come points out that although Article 383 states that officials charged with
corruption and embezzlement where the amount is between 5000 and 10,000
128 J. CHEN, supra note 12, at 192-93.
129 Id. at 174-75 (again reflecting the distinction between two types of contradiction: those between
the enemies of the state and those among the people).
130 Jiang Zemin, supra note 11, at 24.
' Execution Means CPC Is Serious, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 10, 2000.
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RMB ($600 and $1200 U.S.) i32 may receive a lesser punishment-or even
no punishment-where they return the money: "No such option is given to
those that engage in 'blue-collar crimes such as fraud or robbery. The
Criminal Law thus in effect favours 'white collar' over 'blue-collar
crime.""
133
There is also considerable scope for discretion, and therefore
inequality, in the CL when considering the distinction between the
seriousness of the circumstances. The 1997 CL and judicial interpretations
have provided penalty structures for many offenses, but for other crimes the
distinction between serious and less serious circumstances is extremely
vague. Under Article 111, for example, anyone who steals, obtains or
provides state secrets to foreign organizations or persons shall be sentenced
to imprisonment for a term of between five and ten years. Yet, "[i]f the
circumstances are especially serious," the term will be between ten years and
life; and "[i]f the circumstances are relatively minor," the sentence can be
for a term of no more than five years, criminal detention, public surveillance
or deprivation of political rights. Equality must also be considered in light
of Article 37, which states that if the circumstances of a crime are minor,
then an offender may be exempt from punishment, although he may still face
an administrative sanction. These provisions were contained in the 1979 CL,
and it is at least arguable that they continue to reflect a class distinction in
the CL.
134
d. Article 5 and "punishment must fit the crime"
Article 5, another new provision, appears to incorporate the principle
of "just desserts." In conjunction with Article 3, it is also seen to
incorporate the principle of nulla poena sine lege ("no punishment without
law"). Wei Lou views this as a positive change, noting: "This principle is
conducive to avoiding inappropriate penalties, using different criteria, which
result in imposing light punishment for serious crimes or severe punishment
for minor crimes."
'135
This claim is seriously flawed in light of the crime/non-crime
dichotomy. The decision to prosecute someone for stealing under the CL or
132 All currency conversions are approximate, based on the November 2, 2001 conversion rate of I
RMB = 0.12077 U.S. CNNmoney, Currency Converter Results (Nov. 2, 2001), at http://qs.money.
cnn.com/tq/currconv/.
133 Peter Come, Legal System Reforms Promise Substantive-But Limited-Improvement, CHINA L. &
PRACTICE 29, 31 (June 1997).
114 1979 CL, art. 32, LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
135 LUO, supra note 2, at 9.
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to assess an administrative penalty, for example, is simply determined by the
value of the property stolen. When considering the distinction between
crime and administrative penalties in cases of public order, the scope for
discretion is considerable. The principle must also be considered with
regard to the continued reliance on severe punishment and the use of the
death penalty. The 1997 CL incorporated many of the Decisions and
Supplementary Provisions passed by the Standing Committee between 1980
and 1997.136 In doing so it adopted all the increased penalty provisions; in
particular, those contained in the Decision Regarding the Severe Punishment
of Criminals Who Seriously Endanger Public Security (1982), and the
Decision Regarding the Severe Punishment of Criminals Who Seriously
Endanger Public Security (1983). The inclusion of these penalty provisions
in the 1997 CL appears to be an attempt to legitimize these retroactive laws
and their class aspect. Commenting on this and the replacement of
counterrevolutionary offenses by crimes endangering national security, Chen
notes: "Essentially, however, the revision is a matter of renaming,
restructuring and supplementing; the majority of the previous provisions on
'counterrevolutionary crimes' have been retained."137
While the phrase "combining punishment with leniency" has been
removed from Article 1 of the CL, there appears to be a continuation of
policy rather than any real change. This conclusion is supported by the
approach to confessions whereby those who confess can be punished more
leniently, even to the extent of exemption under Article 37, while those who
plead not guilty receive harsher punishment. The distinction in degrees of
seriousness supports this view. A factor in the assessment of the seriousness
of the circumstances is, accordingly, whether or not the accused confesses.
This issue should be considered in light of Article 63, which restates Article
59 of the 1979 CL. Under Article 63, an offender can receive a mitigated
penalty below the minimum and, even where mitigation is not warranted,
may still be given a punishment below the minimum "in light of the special
circumstances of the case." Keith cites a number of examples of the use of
Article 59 in the trials, in 1990 to 1991, of the pro-democracy movement
leaders.' 38 Wang Dan, for example, was convicted under Article 98 of the
1979 CL, but received a sentence of only four years instead of the five-year
136 It did not incorporate all the provisions; as noted in Appendix II of the 1997 CL, it adopted the
provisions of those laws listed with the exception of the provisions relating to administrative sanctions.
1997 CL, app. II, LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
137 J. CHEN, supra note 12, at 186.
138 RONALD KEITH, CHINA'S STRUGGLE FOR THE RULE OF LAW 170-71 (1994).
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minimum. This, according to the authorities, was because Wang had
assisted the State by pointing out other offenders.
39
In commenting on Tiananmen, Cohen noted that the period
immediately following demonstrated an attempt by China to "contain the
fallout from their actions by preserving the role of law in promoting
economic growth, international business co-operation and social
stability.' 40 According to Lin and Keith, this has subsequently resulted in a
convergence of economic reform and criminal law reform.' 4' The other
aspect of this convergence, however, is the meshing of economic reform
with strict social control based on severe punishment. This can be seen
when considering the priority given to reform in the areas of economic crime
and corruption, along with the stipulation of severe penalties including
death, for such offenses. In fact, it should be noted that the promulgation of
the 1997 CL coincided with what could be called a renewed anti-crime
campaign of striking hard at those who committed serious crimes. In his
speech to the NPC in March 1997, Wang Hanbin stated that it was still a
time of public disorder and that many serious economic crimes were being
committed. A reduction in the number of death sentences was, therefore,
unwarranted. 142 In March 1998, Ren Jianxin, President of the Supreme
Court, pledged to "pummel gang crime and corruption which have
increasingly unsettled society in the past five years." 143
3. Amendments to the Criminal Law-Specific Provisions
Part 2 of the 1997 CL sets out the specific offense provisions. The
consolidation process increased the number of articles from 102 in the 1979
CL to 349 in the 1997 CL. With the exception of the abolished
counterrevolutionary crimes, all previous offense articles have been retained,
subject to expansion and amendment, and approximately 200 new articles
added. As with the 1979 CL, articles in the 1997 CL often include several
offenses and, accordingly, there are many more than 349 offenses. The main
changes can be summarized as follows:
139 For a detailed discussion of this and the legal impact of the Tianannen Square incident, see J.A.
Cohen, Tiananmen and the Rule of Law, in THE BROKEN MIRROR: CHINA AFTER TIANANMEN 323 (G.
Hicks ed., 1990).
140 id.
141 Lin & Keith, supra note 3, at 78.
:42 LUO, supra note 2, at 12-13.
43 China Courts To Clamp Down on Crime, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 11, 1998.
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Table: Summary of Amendments to Part 2-Specific Provisions
1979 CL 1997 CL
Chapter I. Crimes of Chapter I. Crimes Endangering
Counterrevolution National Security-Title changed but
provisions mostly retained
Chapter II. Crimes Endangering Chapter. II Crimes Endangering
Public Security Public Security-Title retained but
number of articles increased from 11
to 26
Chapter III. Crimes of Undermining Chapter III. Crimes of Undermining
the Socialist Economic Order the Socialist Market Economic
Order-Title changed and number of
articles increased from 15 to 91
Chapter IV. Crimes of Infringing Chapter IV. Crimes of Infringing
Upon the Rights of the Person and the Upon the Rights of the Person and the
Democratic Rights of Citizens Democratic Rights of Citizens-Title
retained but number of articles
increased from 19 to 31
Chapter V. Crimes of Property Chapter V. Crimes of Property
Violation Violation-Title retained but number
of articles increased from 7 to 14
Chapter VI. Crimes of Obstructing Chapter VI Crimes of Disrupting the
the Administration of Public Order Order of Social Administration-
Title changed and number of articles
increased from 22 to 90
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Chapter VII. Crimes of Disrupting Provisions incorporated in Chapter IV
Marriage and the Family Crimes of Infringing Upon the Rights
of the Person and the Democratic
Rights of Citizens
Chapter VII. Crimes of Endangering
the Interests of National Defense-
This is a new chapter comprising 14
articles
Chapter VIII. Crimes of Dereliction This has been divided into Chapters
of Duty VIII and IX, and the number of
articles significantly increased
Chapter VII. Crimes of
Embezzlement and Bribery comprises
15 articles
Chapter IX. Crimes of Dereliction of
Duty comprises 23 articles
Chapter X. Crimes of Violating
Duties by Military Servicemen-This
is a new chapter and comprises 32
articles
a. Chapter HI: Crimes endangering public security
144
This chapter can be divided into five offense groups. The first group
includes crimes of sabotage against the public infrastructure and commercial
property such as factories and mines, public property such as rivers and
forests, and transportation facilities. 145 The second group includes offenses
relating to terrorism and hijacking. 146 The third group of offenses are
"4 This discussion begins with Chapter II as the offenses in Chapter I, Crimes Endangering National
Security, have already been discussed supra Part III.B.2.a.
See 1997 CL, arts. 114-19, LAWS OFTHE PRC, supra note 1.
146 Id. arts. 120-23.
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specific to the sabotage of broadcasting and telecommunication facilities. 147
Next are firearm and gun control offenses.148 Finally, serious breaches of
health and safety regulations are grouped together.
1 49
b. Chapter III: Crimes of undermining the socialist market economic
order
The inclusion of the term "market" is the first significant change here,
and this reflects Deng's policy of the need for China to move from a planned
to a market economy. The significant changes to China's economic
structure and corresponding crime have resulted in this chapter being the
longest in the 1997 CL. It has been noted, "The length of this Part reflects
the enormous economic and political changes in China that have resulted in
an increase (and increase in variety) of business-crime and the
corresponding concern of the political leadership with such activity."'
5 °
Chapter III is divided into eight sections comprising ninety-one
articles. It also subsumes the 1995 Decision of the Standing Committee on
Penalties for Crimes Violating Company Law and includes offenses of fraud
on shareholders' 5' and false reporting of registered capital.152 Other offenses
relate to the financial market, such as insider dealing 153 and market
manipulation. 154 Apart from these offenses, there are provisions, for
producing and selling counterfeit goods (Section 1), smuggling (Section 2),
counterfeiting currency (Section 4), financial fraud (Section 5), tax offenses
(Section 6), and intellectual property offenses (Section 7).
The amendments in 1997 also sought to abolish or amend the so-
called "three bag offenses." The first of these was Chapter III, Article 118
of the 1979 CL. This article made it an offense to smuggle or speculate as a
regular business. While smuggling can be understood as being criminal,'
5
speculation was an extremely vague and general term. The matter became
even more serious when, in 1982, the offense became punishable by death in
cases of especially huge profits. Such offenses are now mainly covered in
Id. art. 124.
141 Id. arts. 125-30.
"' Id. arts. 131-39.
150 Finder & Fu, supra note 94, at 36-37.
's See 1997 CL, art. 161, LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
2 Id. art. 158.
151 Id. art. 180.
114 Id. art. 182.
155 It is important to note, however, that smuggling could also be very broadly applied as the Article
made no reference to what was smuggled.
JANUARY 2002
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
Section 8, Crimes of Disrupting Market Order, which contains ten articles. 156
This does not mean that there are no longer any offenses which are capable
of being given extremely broad interpretations. Article 225(3), for example,
states, extremely broadly, that it is an offense for anyone to seriously disturb
market order.
The provisions on smuggling have also been expanded, the relevant
crimes being contained in Section 2, Articles 151 through 157, and
incorporate the Standing Committee's Supplementary Provisions
Concerning the Punishment of the Crimes of Smuggling (1988).
c. Chapter IV. Crimes of infringing upon the rights of the person and
the democratic rights of citizens
The 1997 amendments made only one significant change to this part
of the CL, moving offenses relating to marriage and family to this chapter.
Apart from this and some new offenses, this chapter continues to set out the
law relevant to offenses against the person, such as homicide, assault, rape,
sexual molestation, kidnapping, and abduction. The last of this group of
offenses, abduction, reflects a particular social problem in China that has
resulted in the trafficking in women and children for a variety of purposes,
including child labor and prostitution. 57 The chapter, however, still
contains the offense of public insult and defamation. 158 Three important new
offenses are Article 249, inciting racial hatred; Article 250, the publication
of racially discriminatory or humiliating material; and Article 251, the
unlawful deprivation of religious freedom.
d. Chapter V: Crimes of property violation
This chapter sets out the provisions for the main property offenses
such as theft, burglary, robbery, fraud, extortion, and blackmail. A number
of new offenses have been added. Article 265, for example, criminalizes the
counterfeiting of another's telecommunication codes. Articles 271 and 272
deal with corruption in the private sector, while Article 273 covers the
misappropriation of funds or materials for disaster relief.
"36 These Articles incorporate the Standing Committee Decision on the Punishment of Crimes of
Disrupting Financial Order (1995). See LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
57 See 1997 CL, arts. 240-41, LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
"' Id. art. 246
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e. Chapter VI Crimes of disrupting the order of social administration
This chapter has been significantly enlarged. It continues to cover
offenses relating to public order, obstruction of justice, border control,
cultural and historical relics, dangerous drugs, and prostitution, but has
considerably expanded the offense provisions in each category. This again
reflects the Government's concern over the increase in such crimes in China,
in particular drug trafficking and prostitution. The other significant change
is the inclusion of offenses relating to public health (Section 5), and offenses
involving environmental pollution (Section 6).
The 1979 version of this chapter also contained the second of the
"bag" offenses. This was the offense of hooliganism under Article 160.
This article stated that it was an offense "[w]here an assembled crowd
engages in affrays, creates disturbances, humiliates women or engages in
other hooligan activities that undermine public order." Each person so
involved faced a maximum penalty of seven years imprisonment. The
amended provisions have abolished this article and the term "hooligan."
Acts of hooliganism are now specifically covered in Article 237 (indecent
assault), Article 292 (unlawful assembly for fighting), and Article 293
(incitement to fight).
f Chapter VII: Crimes of endangering the interests of national defense
The title of this section is misleading and could be confused with
Chapter 1, Crimes Endangering National Security. The chapter contains a
number of specific offenses that relate to damaging China's military
services. This could occur by means such as obstruction (Article 368),
sabotage (Article 369), demonstrating in a restricted military zone (Article
371), or supplying substandard or defective weapons or installations (Article
370). Other offenses include the impersonation of a military serviceman,
counterfeiting military documents, and unlawfully making uniforms. 
159
There are also a number of offenses relating to desertion or refusal to obey
the draft.' 6  Finally, there are offenses relating to the provision of false
information, the damaging of troop morale, and the failure to provide
supplies and requisitions in times of war.'
61
9 Id. arts. 372, 375.
I6 Id. arts. 373, 376, 379.
161 Id. arts. 377, 378, 380, 381.
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g. Chapter VIII. Crimes of embezzlement and bribery
Chapter VIII of the 1979 CL has been divided into two chapters and
the number of articles has been increased from eight to thirty-eight. The
new Chapter VIII is also a clear reflection of the Government's concern for
the seriousness and frequency of the crimes of embezzlement, bribery, and
corruption committed by State personnel that have plagued the PRC for
many years. From a practical perspective, Chapter VIII subsumes two
earlier laws, the Standing Committee Decision Regarding the Severe
Punishment of Criminals Who Seriously Undermine the Economy (1982)
and the Standing Committee Supplementary Rules on the Severe
Punishment of Corruption and Bribery Offenses (1988). The effect of this
has been to retain the death penalty as a sentencing option in the most
serious of cases. Article 383 sets a scale of penalty according to the
monetary amount of the bribe. This includes: (1) ten years to life if the
amount exceeds 100,000 RMB ($12,000 U.S.), or death if the circumstances
are very serious; (2) five to ten years for amounts between 50,000 and
100,000 RMB ($6000 and 12,000 U.S.), but may be life if the circumstances
are serious; (3) one to seven years for amounts between 5000 and 50,000
RMB ($600 and 6000 U.S.), but seven to ten years if the circumstances are
serious, but if the amount is between 5000 and 10,000 RMB ($600 and 1200
U.S.), the money is returned, and the offender shows true repentance, then
he may be given a mitigated punishment or even exempted from criminal
punishment and subject only to an administrative penalty; (4) up to two
years if the amount is less than 5000 RMB ($600 U.S.) and the
circumstances are relatively serious, but only an administrative sanction if
the circumstances are minor.
The chapter also includes a variety of provisions relating to corruption
by State personnel, while Articles 390, 391, 392, and 393 create offenses
relating to those who bribe State personnel.
h. Chapter IX. Crimes of dereliction of duty
This chapter consists of twenty-three articles and has considerably
expanded the offence provisions in the 1979 CL. The previous Chapter VIII
set out five general offenses relevant to violations by "state functionaries"'
' 62
and "judicial functionaries. 163 These offenses, expanded in the 1997 CL,
162 Id. arts. 186, 187.
63 Id. arts. 188-90.
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apply not only to state functionaries and judicial officers, but also to police,
tax officers, forestry officers, environmental protection officers, public
health inspectors, customs officers, immigration officers, goods and produce
inspectors and animal inspectors. 164 Specific government officers can
therefore be charged under specific articles. 6 '
The revisions in this chapter have also abolished the third of the "bag"
or "pocket" offenses. Article 187 of the 1979 CL stated that: "Any state
functionary who, because of neglect of duty, causes public property or the
interests of the state and the people to suffer heavy losses shall be sentenced
to fixed term imprisonment of not more than five years." Chapter IX now
contains twenty-three articles that specify a variety of actions for which
State functionaries and judicial officers can be prosecuted. In some cases
the offense is quite specific. Article 400, for example, states that a judicial
officer is guilty of an offense if he releases a prisoner without authorization.
Similarly, Article 404 makes it an offense for a tax official to fail to collect
or undercollect taxes for personal gain. Article 187 of the 1979 CL,
however, is retained in an expanded form in Article 397 of the 1997 CL,
which states that it is an offense for any functionary of a State organ to
"abuse his power or neglect his duty, thus causing heavy losses to public
money or property or the interests of the State and the people."
i. Chapter X: Crimes of violating duties by military servicemen
This new chapter comprises thirty-two articles covering a variety of
offenses relating to military service and wartime. According to Article 450,
the chapter is applicable to "military officers, civilian staff, soldiers in active
service and cadets in the People's Liberation Army, police officers, civilian
staff and soldiers in active service and cadets with military status of the
Chinese People's Armed Police and reservists and other persons performing
military tasks." Specific offenses include disobeying orders, leaving one's
post, espionage, defection, weapons offenses, unlawful release of a prisoner
of war, and mistreatment of a prisoner of war. i66 This chapter is
distinguished from Chapter VII, Crimes of Endangering the Interests of
National Defense, by the fact that only those groups or individuals
specifically identified in Article 450 may be prosecuted under Chapter X.
'66 Id. arts. 404-19.
165 Id. art. 407 (relating to Forestry Department officers).
166 [d. arts. 421-30.
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4. General Comments on the New Offense Provisions
An overview of the new offense provisions emphasizes the priority
given to economic crime and corruption. This is not surprising given that of
the twenty-two Decisions and Supplementary Provisions passed by the
Standing Committee before 1996, eleven were directly concerned with such
crimes. 167
Such legislation was also prompted by the comprehensive
developments in economic legislation and supplementary regulation and the
conspicuous failure of the CL to keep pace with such reform. 168 Even with
all the supplementary legislation, the law was still piecemeal and lacking in
certainty. Legal protection was necessary for the newly emerging rights and
interests of individual citizens as a result of the new socialist market
economy. The need to stamp out endemic corruption was paramount.
Economic development could only proceed if legal outcomes were
predictable. The 1997 CL accordingly adopted a far more technical and
comprehensive approach to the law compared to the vagueness and
flexibility of not just the 1979 CL, but also much of the supplementary
legislation that followed.
This trend has continued since the enactment of the 1997 CL with the
1998 Decision and 1999 Amendments also concentrating on economic
crime. 169 Judicial interpretations have also focused on this aspect of the CL.
16 These included the Supplementary Provision of the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress Concerning the Punishment of the Crimes of Smuggling (1988), the Supplementary Provisions of
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Concerning the Punishment of the Crimes of
Embezzlement and Bribery (1998). the Supplementary Provisions of the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China Regarding the Imposition of Punishment in
Respect of Offenses of Tax Evasion and Refusal to Pay Tax (1992), the Supplementary Provisions of the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress regarding Punishment of Crimes of Counterfeiting
Registered Trademarks (1993), the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
on Punishing Crimes of Falsely Making Out, Forging or Illegally Selling Special Invoices for Value-Added
Tax (1995), the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Punishment of
Crimes of Production and Sale of Fake or Substandard Commodities (1993), the Decision on the
Infringement of Copyright (1994), the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress on Punishment of Crimes of Disrupting Financial Order (1995) and the Decision of Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress of Falsely Making Out, Forging or Illegally Selling Special
Invoices for Value-added Tax (1995). See LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
168 It should also be pointed out that amendments to the Constitution in 1988 and 1993 emphasised
the move to a market economy. In 1988, Article II of the Constitution was amended to include permission
for the development of the private sector. In 1993, the wording of Article 15 was changed so as to read,
"The state practices socialist market economy." See LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
169 See Decision of Standing Committee of National People's Congress on Punishing Crimes of
Fraudulently Purchasing, Evading and Illegally Trading in Foreign Exchange (adopted 6' h Meeting of the
Ninth National People's Congress, Dec. 29, 1998), and the Amendments on Offenses Relating to Securities
and Futures (1999), LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
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Two examples from 1999 include the Interpretation of Several Issues
Concerning the Application of the Law in Handling Illegal Publication
Cases, and the Interpretation on Questions Relating to the Trial of Cases
Arising from the Resale of Train Tickets for a Profit. There were many
interpretations that followed the CL soon after its promulgation, but at this
stage it would appear that the CL is relatively comprehensive and stable.
The amendment process, however, is still under the control of the Standing
Committee, and as yet there has been no consideration of the legality of such
amendments in relation to the provisions of the Constitution, particularly
Article 67(3).
C. The Role of the Supreme Court and Supreme Procuratorate
Since 1979, the CL has been supplemented by numerous
interpretations and directives issued by the Supreme Court and the Supreme
Procuratorate, either separately or jointly.170 The Standing Committee was
empowered to directly interpret the CL 17 ' but has not done so, confining
itself to enacting Decisions and Supplementary Provisions in order to
provide interpretations of the CL. The State Council was also empowered to
interpret the many administrative laws that came within its area of control.
As stated, many of these interpretations have actually been included in
the new provisions of the 1997 CL. In October 1999, however, draft
legislation ("Legislative Law") was published which proposed significant
changes to the interpretation of law in China. The draft proposed that only
the Standing Committee and the Supreme Court be empowered to interpret
the law. On March 15, 2000, the Ninth National People's Congress adopted
the Legislation Law of the People's Republic of China. The power to
interpret national law vests in the Standing Committee. 172 Article 43 states
that the Supreme Court, Supreme Procuratorate, State Council and other
specified bodies may make requests for legislative interpretation to the
Standing Committee.
This new law is very significant. In the past the Supreme Court issued
interpretations on its own, but more often it did so jointly with the Supreme
170 This was provided for under the four basic rules of the Resolution of the Standing Committee of
National People's Congress Providing an Improved Interpretation of the Law (1981). See LAWS OF THE
PRC, supra note 1, although this Resolution must now be read in light of the Legislation Law (2000),
http://www.isinolaw.com.
'71 See Resolution of the Standing Committee of National People's Congress Providing an Improved
Interpretation of the Law, supra note 170, and the Constitution, art. 67, LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
See also Legislation Law, sec. 4, supra note 170.
172 Legislation Law, art. 42, supra note 170.
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People's Procuratorate. The Supreme Court, Supreme Procuratorate,
Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Public Security also jointly issued
many interpretations. 173 It is unclear, however, how the Standing
Committee's Resolution on Providing an Improved Interpretation of the Law
(1981) is to be interpreted in light of the Legislation Law. According to
Article 2 of the Resolution, the Supreme Court shall provide interpretations
of questions involving the specific application of laws and decrees in court
trials. Similarly, the Supreme Procuratorate can interpret laws and decrees
relating to procuratorial work. The interpretative powers of the Supreme
Court and Supreme Procuratorate must also be considered in light of the
Several Provisions on Judicial Interpretation (1997), and Judicial
Interpretation Work Tentative Provisions (1996), respectively. Both
Provisions confirmed the powers of the Supreme Court and Supreme
Procuratorate as outlined in the 1981 Resolution, and that such
interpretations are to have legal effect. The State Council's 17 4 power to
interpret administrative rules and regulations also appears to be unchanged.
According to Article 43 of the Legislation Law, however, it now
appears that where either the Supreme Court, Supreme Procuratorate, or
State Council require interpretation of a national law for implementation of
that law, then they should request such an interpretation from the Standing
Committee. The Supreme Court and Supreme Procuratorate separately or
jointly, or the State Council can accordingly issue interpretations which do
not fall into such a category. Where there is conflict, for example, between
the Supreme Court and Supreme Procuratorate, this would have to be
resolved by the Standing Committee. It would also appear to be the case
that an interpretation issued by the Standing Committee would have
precedence over any conflicting interpretation issued by the Supreme Court,
Supreme Procuratorate or State Council.
IV. INTERPRETATION OF THE CL SINCE 1997175
A. General Interpretations by the Supreme Court and Supreme
Procuratorate
Following the enactment of the 1997 CL, the Supreme Court and
Supreme Procuratorate issued a number of interpretations. In fact, the need
173 See, e.g., Circular on Some Questions in Handling Criminals Who Escape and Commit New
Crimes (1989), LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
174 This includes government departments.
175 All Interpretations are published in the volumes of the Gazette of the Supreme People's Court.
VOL. I1INo. I
THE CRIMINAL LA W OF CHINA
to provide interpretations of the 1997 CL was recognized even before it
came into effect on October 1, 1997. In September 1997, over 100 judges
and jurists attended a national judicial conference in Beijing. Seven draft
interpretations were discussed. 176 The one interpretation that emerged from
the conference determined the manner in which Article 12, the non-
retroactivity clause, would be enforced.
77
The interpretation, issued on September 27, 1997, stipulated that a
criminal who commits another crime before September 30, 1997, and that
crime occurs more than three years after his earlier crime(s), shall be dealt
with in accordance with the provisions of the 1979 CL, and even if he were
to be tried after October 1, 1997, he should not be classified as a
recidivist. 178
Another interpretation considered the approach to be taken when
offenses overlap. An example is the possible overlap between Article 140,
selling fake goods and Article 214, selling goods with a counterfeit
trademark. The first step in determining which offense applies is to consider
any special provisions that are contained in the offense provisions. This may
relate to specific subjects (for example, state personnel), specific physical
locations (restricted military areas), specific time periods (wartime), or
specific circumstances. Applying this to Articles 140 and 214, there are
various ways to differentiate the two offenses. With regard to the accused,
Article 140 specifies that the defendant must be a producer or distributor,
whereas Article 214 refers to "anyone who sells." Article 140 further sets
out specific details regarding the various punishments depending on the
value of the sale of the goods. If, for example, the amount sold is between
50,000 and 200,000 RMB ($6000 and 24,000 U.S.), then the punishment can
be a maximum of two years imprisonment, criminal detention, and a fine of
not less than fifty percent of the sale amount, but not more than two times
the value. If, however, the sale amount exceeds 2,000,000 RMB ($250,000
U.S.), then the maximum penalty is fifteen years imprisonment and a fine.
Article 214 carries a maximum penalty, in the most serious of
circumstances, of three to seven years imprisonment and a fine. This
distinction between penalties is important because the interpretation
176 After the conference one interpretation was published, while the other six were referred to the
Adjudication Committee of the Supreme People's Court.
7'7 For a detailed discussion of the conference, see Jun, supra note 75.
"8 Article 65 of the 1997 CL increased the period from three (1979 CL, art. 61) to five years.
Offenders who are now convicted of a crime, punishable by a fixed term of imprisonment, within five years
of an earlier conviction, receive a heavier punishment.
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stipulates that, as a general guideline, the offense with the heavier penalty
should be preferred.
After September 1997, further interpretations were issued. In April
and May 1999 respectively, the Supreme Court issued the Interpretation of
Relevant Questions Concerning the Concrete Application of the Law in
Trying Organization Crime Cases and the Interpretation on Questions
Relating to the Trial of Criminal Cases Arising from the Resale at a Profit of
Train Tickets. On September 16, 1999, the Supreme Procuratorate also
issued explanations on thirty-eight "clauses" of the CL regarding corruption,
bribery, and dereliction of duty. 1
79
B. The Crackdown on the Falun Gong
The most controversial (from a Western perspective, that is) judicial
interpretation was that issued on October 30, 1999. This interpretation,
jointly issued by the Supreme Court and Supreme Procuratorate, sought to
"explain" the law against "cult crime" under Article 300 of the 1997 CL. It
is this interpretation, combined with Article 300, that has been used to
prosecute members of Falun Gong. This interpretation is important from
two perspectives. The first, which is the topic of this article, is that it
provides an opportunity to evaluate the extent to which there has been real
reform, and whether 1997 CL truly represents an adoption of the rule of law
in China. The second perspective, which is not discussed here, is that it is a
very recent example of the process of criminalization in China.
In April 1999, the Falun Gong held a large demonstration in Beijing
to protest against unfair practices in various provinces which had
discriminated against its members. The size of the demonstration shocked
the authorities and their response was severe.
The Falun Gong has mainly been charged with violating Article 300
of the 1997 CL. This states:
Whoever forms or uses superstitious sects or secret societies or
strange religious organisations or uses superstition to
undermine the implementation of the laws and administrative
rules and regulations of the State shall be sentenced to fixed-
term imprisonment of not less than three years but no more than
seven years; if the circumstances are especially serious, he shall
179 CHINA DAILY, Sept. 17, 1999.
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be sentenced to fixed term imprisonment of not less than seven
years.
This is a vague offense, and in early October 1999 the Supreme Court
and Supreme Procuratorate issued a lengthy and detailed interpretation.
Subsequently, the Standing Committee Decision Regarding Outlawing Cult
Organizations and Punishing Cult Activities was issued, with both the
interpretation and Decision effective as of October 30, 1999. 80 The
interpretation resembled an act of legislation, while the Decision, in contrast,
more closely resembled a statement of policy. In order to fully understand
the implications of the interpretation, it is set out in full below as it was
reported in the China Daily on November 1, 1999: 181
The judicial interpretation jointly issued by the two departments
says that "cult groups" in Article 300 in the Criminal Law
refers to those illegal groups that have been found using
religion, qigong or other things as a camouflage, deifying their
leading members, recruiting and controlling their members and
deceiving people by moulding and spreading superstitious
ideas, and endangering society.
Section 1 of Article 300 in the Criminal Law stipulates that
those who organize superstitious sects and secret societies or
use superstition to violate laws or administrative regulations are
subject to three to seven years imprisonment, and those whose
cases are extremely serious are subject to seven years
imprisonment or more.
Under Section 2 and 3 of the article, those who set up or use
superstitious sects and secret societies or superstition to deceive
people and cause death of others are subject to the same
penalties.
Under the two sections, those who organize and use
superstitious sects, secret societies or superstitions to sexually
exploit women or swindle money or property will be punished
according to Criminal Law articles on rape and swindling.
o See LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
181 Judicial Explanations on Crimes by Cults, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 1, 1999, at 4.
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Those who organize and use sects and commit one of the
following activities should be penalised according to Section 1,
Article 300 of the Criminal Law:
1. Gathering people together to besiege and charge
government organisations, enterprises or institutions, and
disrupt their work, production and teaching and research
activities;
II. Holding illegal assembly, demonstrations to incite or
deceive, or organize their members or others to besiege,
charge, seize, disrupt public places or places for religious
activities, or disrupt social order;
III. Resisting departments concerned with banning their
groups, resuming the banned groups, establishing other
sects, or continuing their activities;
IV. Instigating, deceiving or organising their members or
others to refuse fulfilling their legal obligations;
V. Publishing, printing, duplicating or distributing
publications spreading malicious fallacies, and printing
symbols of their sects;
VI. Other activities that violate the State law or
administrative regulations.
According to the explanations, a case is regarded as serious if it
involves any of the following while conducting the activities in
the previous article:
1. Setting up organizations or recruiting members across
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities that
are under the direct administration of the central
government;
II. Collaborating with overseas groups, organisations and
individuals for sect-related activities;
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III. Publishing, printing, duplicating and distributing, either
in terms of volumes or sales values, a large amount of
publications spreading fallacious ideas and printing
symbols of sects;
IV. Instigating, deceiving or organising their members or
others to violate State laws, administrative regulations,
and resulting in serious consequences.
Organizing or using superstitious sects, secret societies or
superstition to deceive people which may lead to their
death in Section 2 and 3 of Article 300, refers to the cases
of establishing or using sects to mould, spread
superstition or fallacies, deceiving their members or
others to practice fast, inflict wounds upon themselves, or
prevent patients from taking normal medical treatment
and resulting in their illness or death.
According to the interpretation, doing these things will be
considered a "serious offense" if the following occurs:
I. Causing three deaths or more;
II. Causing fewer than three deaths, but injuring many
people;
III. Those who have received criminal or administrative
penalties for engaging in cult activities continue to
establish or use sects to deceive people and result in
deaths;
IV. Causing other special serious consequences.
Under the explanations, those who establish or use sects to
mold, spread superstition and fallacies, instigate and coerce
their members or others to commit suicide or inflict wounds on
themselves, should be punished according to laws on attempted
murder or causing serious injuries.
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Those who organize and use superstitious sects and sexually
exploit women or young girls by seducing, coercing, deceiving
or other ways should be punished according to clauses on rape,
or offenses concerning raping underage girls, under the
Criminal Law.
Those who swindle money or property by establishing or using
sects or other means should be punished according to the
Criminal Law articles on swindling offenses.
The offenses of establishing or using sects to organize, scheme,
carry out and instigate activities of splitting China, endangering
the reunification of China or subverting the country's socialist
system should be handled according to relevant laws on
endangering State security offenses, as stipulated in the
Criminal Law.
All the money and property collected by sects or criminal
offenders who use sects to violate laws, and tools and publicity
materials used for criminal activities, should be confiscated.
Those who organize, plot or use sects for criminal activities and
those participants who refuse to change their ways despite
repeated admonition should be investigated and be given the
related criminal offense, according to Criminal Law.
But those who surrender themselves to law enforcement
departments, or who perform meritorious services, will be
given a lenient penalty or may be exempt from penalty
according to law.
Those who were deceived or coerced into sects and had already
withdrawn from the sect will not be considered offenders.
The most important aspect of the interpretation is its specificity in
targeting the practices of the Falun Gong. Section 1, for example, now
prohibits any demonstrations or public gatherings and, accordingly, any
reoccurrence of the April 1999 demonstration. The provisions can also be
used to discourage any form of public assembly as the recent arrests of Falun
Gong members in Tiananmen Square demonstrate. It is also a crime under
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Article 300 for persons to set up such organisations across provinces and
collaborate with overseas groups, and this clearly reflects Falun Gong's
membership across the PRC and the existence of practicing groups in many
other countries, including the United States, Canada, and Australia. In
addition, the interpretation targets the Falun Gong practices of fasting, diet,
and not taking drugs and medicines. It is estimated that this interpretation
creates at least ten separate offenses under Article 300. If the provisions
relating to "serious" and "very serious" circumstances are included, then this
number would be even higher.
One view of this interpretation is that it creates new offenses. Its use
against Falun Gong members based on activities that predate the
interpretation is, therefore, contrary to the rule against retroactivity. The
opposing view, and that which is held by the Chinese government, is that the
interpretation does not create new offenses but merely supplements Article
300 by more clearly defining the types of behaviour that are covered by
Article 300. The fact that the provisions of the interpretation are so specific
in terms of Falun Gong practices and characteristics and that such an
interpretation was not deemed necessary until after the Beijing
demonstration, makes this argument rather unconvincing.
Of considerable interest are some of the commentaries on the
crackdown that have appeared in the press. On November 8, 1999, for
example, the China Daily carried the report of an interview with Guo Yang,
Director of the Beijing Hualian Law Firm. 182 He observed that the
interpretation and Standing Committee Decision provided a legal basis for
the campaign against cults. 183 He further noted that "there have been no
such accurate laws directly dealing with crimes committed by cults before,"
and that "it is one of China's efforts to build a more mature legal system and
develop towards a rule of law."
184
On December 26, 1999, the first major trial against four Falun Gong
members was completed. 85 The charges included using a cult to obstruct
justice, causing deaths in the process of organizing a cult and illegally
obtaining State secrets. 86 All four defendants were convicted and sentenced
to terms of eighteen, sixteen, twelve and seven years respectively.1
8 7
..2 State Adamant in Elimination of Cults, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 8, 1999, at 2.
183 Id.
18 id.
185 Key Falun Gong Cult Members Sentenced, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 27, 1999, at 1. The four
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The media report of that trial contains a number of important
statements on the operation of the criminal law, the punishment imposed,
and the trial procedure. First, the report states that the court took a lenient
approach to the first and fourth defendants. 188 The first defendant, who was
sentenced to eighteen years, was given a mitigated penalty because he had
confessed and exposed the criminal activities of the Falun Gong, including
its founder Li Hongzhi. 189 The fourth defendant had also confessed and
shown repentance and was accordingly sentenced to seven years. 190 With
regard to procedure, the report noted that all defendants had been sent copies
of the indictments and notified of their rights. 191 Three defendants had hired
lawyers and the court appointed a lawyer for the fourth defendant.' 92 Prior
to the trial, the lawyers had met with their clients on several occasions and,
at the trial, the lawyers challenged the accusations. 93 Finally, the report
stated that relatives of the defendants, reporters from the media, and many
other individuals were present at the trial. 1
94
On the same day, Wang Zuofu, Professor at the Institute of
Jurisprudence of People's University, commented that the sentences were
based on the facts, the relevant law, and had "sufficient legal backing." 195
He went on to say that the four had been responsible for the deaths of 1400
people across China by manipulating their deaths or self-inflicted injury.
The Professor concluded, "[I]t is clear that the court handled the case strictly
in line with the law."'
196
The tenor of both reports is reminiscent of the rhetoric of the 1983
anti-crime campaign and the phrases of "arrested and charged according to
law," "tried according to law," "convicted according to law," and "punished
according to law."
' ' 97
The crackdown on the Falun Gong has continued unabated and
appears to dominate the political agenda of the most senior government and
party officials. In June 2001, the Supreme Court and Supreme Procuratorate










197 See Clarke, supra note 57, at 1900.
VOL. I I No. I
THE CRIMINAL LA W OF CHINA
overall umbrella of Article 300.198 Under Article 1(1) of the Interpretation,
for example, it is an offense under Article 300 to "make or spread 300 pieces
of heresy flyers, pictures, slogans or newspapers, more than 100 books, more
than 100 compact discs, or more than 100 video or audio cassettes.' 9 9
Further offenses are also specified in relation to Articles 103 and 105
(Crimes Endangering National Security), and Articles 232 and 234
(Intentional Homicide and Intentional Infliction of Injury). a°° With regard to
Articles 232 and 234 of the CL, Article 9 of the Interpretation states that it
will be an offense under the CL for a heresy organization to organize,
promote, incite, instigate, or help members of the organization to commit
suicide or acts of self-deformity. 201 In fact, these were the provisions
applied in August 2001 to the conviction and sentencing of the alleged Falun
Gong members who, the court held, had incited the self-immolations in
Tiananmen Square.
20 2
V. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN CRIME AND NON-CRIME
Many of the reforms in the CL must be considered in light of the
continued distinction between crimes enumerated in the Specific Provisions
of the CL and "offenses" included under the numerous administrative
penalty laws. 203 The distinction between criminal and administrative
offenses could be compared to the felony/misdemeanour or
indictable/summary dichotomies in common law. This so-called crime/non-
crime dichotomy has, in effect, created two separate systems of liability and
punishment.
The foundation for the administrative penalty system is found in the
provisions of the CL. According to Article 13 of the 1997 CL, an act will
not be considered to be a crime "if the circumstances are obviously minor
198 Interpretations of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate on Some
Issues Concerning the Specific Application of Laws When Handling Criminal Cases of Organizing and




202 People Behind Tiananmen Square Suicide Sentenced, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 18, 2001.
203 See 1997 CL, arts. 3-5, LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
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and the harm done is not serious. ' 2 4 An individual in such circumstances,
however, may be subject to an administrative sanction. °5
The most prominent of the administrative regulations is the Security
Administration Punishment Regulations ("SAPR") (1986), but other
legislation, such as the Law on Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste
(1995), also includes administrative regulations.20 6 In addition, the State
Council has enacted numerous rules and regulations that are applied
administratively. 20 7 In many cases, a decision as to whether an offense will
be prosecuted as criminal or dealt with under the SAPR will be decided by
the likely penalty or punishment to be imposed. Article 2 of the SAPR
states:
Whoever disturbs social order, endangers public safety,
infringes upon citizens' rights of the person or encroaches upon
public or private property, if such an act constitutes a crime
according to the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of
China, shall be investigated for criminal responsibility; if such
an act is not serious enough for criminal punishment but should
be given administrative penalties for public security, penalties
shall be given according to these regulations.2 8
The distinction between acts that are treated as crimes and those that
trigger administrative sanctions, however, is arbitrary. For example,
whether theft is charged as a crime or under the SAPR is simply determined
by the amount of money involved. Other offenses include minor assaults,
public order infringements, vandalism, traffic violations and failure to
register residence.
204 This wording is very similar to that in Article 10 of the 1979 CL. See LAWS OF THE PRC, supra
note 1.
205 Even where a person is criminally liable, they may be exempt from criminal punishment due to
minor circumstances. Article 37 of the 1997 CL states that in such circumstances they could still be subject
to an administrative sanction. See LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
206 See relevant volumes of the LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1. Article 59 of the Law on
Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste (1995), for example, sets out a number of prohibited acts with
regard to solid waste. Id. It further empowers the "competent department of environmental protection to
order him to put it right within a specified period of time and impose a penalty on him." Id. Such
provisions should also be read in conjunction with Articles 338-46 of the 1997 CL, which set out the
"Crimes of Impairing the Protection of the Environment and Resources." Article 338, for example, carries
a maximum penalty of seven years for someone who causes a major environmental pollution accident. See
1997 CL, LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
207 Government departments and agencies are also empowered to pass such regulations. An example
of such an agency is the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA).
201 See LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
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There are a number of controversial aspects of the SAPR. These
include procedural deficiencies, including the lack of any real hearing or
satisfactory process of review or appeal with regard to penalties, and the use
of certain additional sanctions: "rehabilitation and re-education through
labor" (laodong jiaoyang) and "sheltering for investigation" (shourong
shencha).20 9 The use of these sanctions has been a major concern for
western observers of the Chinese criminal justice system because they can
be used to detain political dissidents. Sheltering for investigation was of
particular concern, although this form of detention was abolished in 1996.21°
Re-education and rehabilitation through labor, though, continues to be used
in a regime or structure of sanctions that appears to exist outside of both the
administrative penalty and criminal law systems. This and other practices of
the Public Security Bureau remain controversial both in and outside China.
The other concern with the operation of the system of administrative
penalties was that responsibility for the investigation, determination, and
punishment of these so-called minor offenses was under the authority of the
Public Security Bureau. The SAPR contained few provisions in relation to
any form of hearing or appeals process. In 1996, the law and system of
administrative offenses underwent major reform with the enactment of the
Administrative Penalty Law (APL).211 Article I states that the purpose of
the law is to standardize "the creation and imposition of administrative
penalties, ensuring and supervising the effective exercise of administration
by administrative organs, safeguarding public interests and public order, and
protecting the lawful rights and interests of citizens, legal persons and other
organisations."
While the Public Security Bureau remains the central administrative
organ, the APL has introduced a number of safeguards. In particular,
Chapter V sets out numerous procedural requirements that must follow a
decision to impose an administrative penalty. One important example is
Article 32:
The parties shall have the right to state their cases and defend
themselves. Administrative organs shall fully heed the opinions
of the parties and shall examine the facts, grounds and evidence
209 Id. The sanctions proscribed in the SAPR are warnings, fines, and administrative detentions. Id.
In addition, any property obtained as a result of the offense can be confiscated and, if relevant, victim
compensation can also be ordered. Id.
210 The abolition of this form of detention, however, does not appear in any formal decision by the
NPC or Standing Committee. Its abolition followed from the enactment of the 1996 CPL.
211 LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
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put forward by the parties; if the facts, grounds and evidence
put forward by the parties are established, the administrative
organs shall accept them. Administrative organs shall not
impose heavier penalties on the parties just because the parties
have tried to defend themselves.
As one observer noted:
Article 32 of the APL may be one of the most significant
articles to be enacted by the NPC over the last several years.
The introduction of the concept of natural justice to the extent
expressed above is nothing less than revolutionary when seen
against the backdrop of China's political and cultural history.212
Having said this, however, the rights of the individual are still limited.
Many of the rights and protections contained in the 1996 CPL are not
available to someone who is subject to an administrative penalty.2 3 Nor is
there any mention, as in the CL, of the principles to be applied for a breach
of an administrative regulation. 214 This is justified by the designation of
such offenses as non-crime, and by the fact that the penalties are not
punishments. However, the distinction between crime and breaches of
administrative regulations is vague and, at the level of principle, perhaps
unsustainable. Special note should be made here of Articles 4 and 5 of the
APL. Article 4 provides: "Creation and imposition of administrative
penalty shall be based on the facts and shall be in correspondence with the
facts, nature and seriousness of the violations of law and damage done to
society." Article 5 provides: "In imposing administrative penalty and
setting to rights illegal acts, penalty shall be combined with education, so
that citizens, legal persons and other organisations shall become aware of the
importance of observing the law." These provisions contain terms that are
descriptive of the criminal law. In addition, there appears to be considerable
discretion and scope for abuse, especially regarding the initial decision
whether to prosecute an individual under the CL or impose an administrative
penalty. In commenting on this as part of his assessment of the 1997 CL,
Chen notes, "The problem of the artificial distinction between administrative
sanctions and criminal penalties is simply un-addressed. 2t 5
2'2 Come, supra note 133, at 31-32.
2 3 Legal representation is an example.
2:4 See, e.g., 1997 CL, arts. 3-5, LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
215 j. CHEN, supra note 12, at 196.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In analyzing the 1997 CL, it is apparent that there has been
considerable change and reform. In order to fully understand the new law, it
is also important to consider the development of criminal law in the PRC
from its inception. This includes the period leading up to the 1979 CL, the
Decisions and Supplementary Provisions passed by the Standing Committee
from 1979 to 1996 (and since 1997), the interpretations issued by the
Supreme Court and Supreme Procuratorate, cases, and, finally, the 1997 CL
itself. There is no denying that there has been significant change in the law.
This is reflected not just in the offense provisions, but also in the general
principles. Chinese rhetoric concerning such reforms has lead to the claim
that there has been an adoption of the rule of law in China. These changes
and the rhetoric are extremely important, but it is the conclusion of this
Article that while the law has changed, the underlying principles and
policies on which Chinese criminal law is based have not. On the contrary,
it is possible to conclude that policy, in particular, has shown a remarkable
continuity and resistance to change.
In assessing this, it is important to place the development of criminal
law in the PRC in a historical context. In doing so, one encounters a major
misconception. This is that many, both within and outside of China, opine
that modem legal reform in the PRC did not start until 1979 with the
enactment of laws including the 1979 CL, the 1979 CPL, the Organic Law
of the People's Courts and the Organic Law of the People's
216Procuratorates. In addition, the period from 1949 to 1979 is seen as
having little relevance to the post-1979 period. This is misleading. From a
practical perspective, it must be remembered that the 1979 CL was largely
based on the thirty-third draft of the CL, completed in 1963. As many of the
provisions of 1979 CL are contained in the 1997 CL, in either identical or
revised form, it is arguable that the principles and policies espoused in this
earlier period continue to affect the determination of criminal liability in
China today. As noted earlier, the 1956 to 1957 Lectures or Chung-huajen-
min kung-ho-kuo hsing-fa tsung chiang-J, described the purposes of the
criminal law as follows:
216 This highlights those laws relevant to the creation of a new criminal justice system. It should also
be noted that a new Constitution was enacted in 1978, although this was amended in 1982. Other important
laws passed in 1979 included the Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and Local People's
Government and the Electoral Law.
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The criminal law of our country mainly attacks
counterrevolutionary criminals and criminals who murder,
commit arson, steal, swindle, rape, and commit other crimes
that seriously undermine social order and socialist construction.
We must make it clear that the sharp point of our criminal law
is mainly directed at the enemies of socialism. 217
Such purposes were clearly evident in Article 2 of the 1979 CL, which
stated that the tasks of the CL included the fight against
counterrevolutionary and other criminal acts "in order to defend the system
of the dictatorship of the proletariat" and "to safeguard the smooth progress
of the socialist revolution and socialist construction." One of the objectives
of the 1997 revisions was the depoliticization of the CL, through the
removal of such terms as "dictatorship of the proletariat" and "socialist
revolution," but do they reflect any real change? Finder and Fu, for
example, state, "These changes are more symbolic than substantial and have
little practical impact on the operation of the criminal law.' 218
This contrasts with the views of Lin and Keith who observe that "the
revision also reflects changes in the prioritization of class struggle, state
interests and social control as the Criminal Law's substantive purposes are
now more closely aligned with the policy purposes of economic reform., 21 9
While economic reform and Deng's open-door policy were the
driving forces behind the enactment of the 1997 CL, the revisions do not
appear to reflect any real change and the criminal law remains the principal
instrument of state policy and strict social control. A comprehensive
analysis of the changes introduced in 1997 suggests that they are just a
subtle variation of the same policies that formed the basis of the 1979 CL.
There is considerable support for such a conclusion.
This can be initially demonstrated through an analysis of the
numerous Standing Committee Decisions and Supplementary Provisions
from 1979 to 1996. The purpose of these Decisions and Provisions was
twofold. First, they provided detail missing from the 1979 CL, relating to
provisions concerning both liability and punishment. Second, some of the
Decisions were part of anti-crime campaigns and crackdowns, which took
place during this period. All the criminal law provisions of these Decisions
and Supplementary Provisions have been incorporated in the 1997 CL under
the three guiding principles for the 1997 revisions: continuity, unity, and
217 COHEN, supra note 26, at 79.
2 8 Finder & Fu, supra note 94, at 35.
2 19 Lin & Keith, supra note 3, at 76.
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clarity. Under the headings of continuity and unity, the 1979 CL was largely
retained along with the Decisions and Supplementary Provisions. Under the
heading of clarity, vague provisions were elaborated and clarified.
Reghirding the Decisions forming the basis of the anti-crime
campaigns, two stand out. These are the Decision Regarding the Severe
Punishment of Criminals Who Seriously Sabotage the Economy (1982), and
the Decision Regarding the Severe Punishment of Criminals Who Seriously
Endanger Public Security (1983). The effect of both Decisions was to
increase the maximum penalty for many offenses. Zhao Bingzhi and He
Xingwang argue that these Decisions, as well as all other Standing
Committee laws which supplemented the 1979 CL, were unlawful. 220 This
is because they contradicted the rule against retroactivity and the principle of
nullem crimen sine lege. All such laws were therefore contrary to Article
67(3) of the Constitution. The incorporation of these Standing Committee
Laws in the provisions of the 1997 CL appears to be an attempt to legitimise
the contested Decisions. Even so, the process of supplementation and
amendment is continuing. On December 29, 1998, the Standing Committee
passed the Decision on Penalizing Crimes of Foreign Exchange Defrauding,
Evasion and Illegal Transaction. This was followed, on October 30, 1999,
by the Standing Committee Decision Regarding Outlawing Cult
Organizations and Punishing Cult Activities. In what is seen as a significant
change in approach, the Standing Committee, on December 26, 1999, passed
amendments to the CL for offenses relating to securities and futures.
The Supreme Court and Supreme Procuratorate have provided much
of the detail of how the CL is to be defined, interpreted and applied.22 1 A
very controversial example of this was the Interpretation Explaining Crimes
by Cults under Article 300 of the CL, issued jointly by the Supreme Court
and Supreme Procuratorate on October 30, 1999, and effective the same day.
Apart from the legislative nature of the enforcement provision, an analysis
of the Interpretation reveals that it has created at least ten new offenses
within Article 300.
Ashworth states:
The main determinants of criminalization continue to be
political opportunism and power, both linked to the prevailing
220 Id. at 93.
221 The power of the Supreme Court and Supreme Procuratorate to interpret legislation must now be
read in light of both the Standing Committee's Resolution on Providing an Improved Interpretation of the
Law (1981), LAWS OFTHE PRC, supra note 1, and the Legislation Law (2000), supra note 170.
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culture of the country. The contours of criminal law are not
given but politically contingent. Seemingly objective criteria
such as harm and offense tend to melt into the political
ideologies of the time.
222
Between 1949 and 1979, Communist Party policy dominated the legal
system, often in the form of decrees by Mao Zedong. In many ways, these
decrees and Party policy were the law and, as such, had a profound effect on
the laws that were passed in 1979 and thereafter. This is clearly reflected in
the Preamble to the Constitution, which states that China and all its
nationalities are under the leadership of the Communist Party and the
guidance of Mao Zedong Thought. Article I of the 1979 CL also stated that
the Criminal Law took as its guide Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong
Thought. It is noted that this phrase has been removed from Article 1 of the
1997 CL, but it is arguable that aspects of Mao Zedong Thought continue to
affect Chinese criminal law.
One of Mao's most important policy statements on criminal law made
a distinction between antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions.
Those who were guilty of antagonistic contradictions such as
counterrevolution or other serious crimes involving violence or large
amounts of money were considered enemies of the state. Conflicts between
citizens, which did not threaten the socialist system, were defined as non-
antagonistic contradictions. In line with the policy of "combining
punishment with leniency," non-antagonistic contradictions could be
punished less severely than antagonistic contradictions, even to the extent of
being exempt from punishment and subject only to an administrative
sanction. Antagonistic contradictions were to be punished severely and in
many cases this meant the death penalty. Even here, however, leniency
could be applied where the accused confessed and showed true repentance.
In the case of the death penalty, this could lead to a two-year suspension and
eventual commutation. The wording of the CL may have changed in 1997
but the current approach to liability and punishment continues to reflect such
policy.
Perhaps the most symbolic amendment in 1997 was the abolition of
counterrevolutionary crimes and their replacement by crimes endangering
national security. In reality, this is nothing more than a change in name.
Most of the crimes of counterrevolution are simply retained as crimes
against national security. For example, Article 102 of the 1997 CL, which
222 A. ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 56 (3d ed. 1999).
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makes it an offense to collude with a foreign state to endanger the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of the PRC, is virtually
identical to Article 91 of the 1979 CL. In fact, the 1997 CL has expanded
the range of offenses. As Chen notes:
The revised law also adds a provision to make it a crime for
state personnel to desert their position and escape to foreign
countries to engage in activities endangering state security.223
Apparently, this provision is aimed at those who were sent to
work or study abroad and then decided to stay by, for example,
applying for refugee status in a foreign country.
224
It is also important to note again that proposals to drop the use of the
term "counterrevolutionary" were first made soon after the enactment of the
1979 CL. In fact, such changes had been incorporated in the 1988 draft CL.
The circumstances of Tiananmen Square in 1989, however, were seen as an
inappropriate time to enact a revised CL, particularly as
counterrevolutionary offenses provided a useful tool against the pro-
democracy movement.
China continues to charge political dissidents and those involved in
the pro-democracy movement with crimes against national security. For
example, in December 1998, Xu Wenli and Wang Youcai were sentenced to
thirteen and eleven years imprisonment, respectively, for their roles in
planning and founding the China Democratic Party.225
Nevertheless, many in China see the 1997 CL as a continuation, if not
a culmination, of a law reform process leading to the adoption of the rule of
law in China. For example, Lin and Keith see the principles expressed in
Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the CL, and the major expansion of the specific
offense provisions as the continuation of a trend, which is "remarkable in its
reiterated support for the rational importance of predictability and the
procedural protection of non-state interests. 226 In 1997, Jiang Zemin made
his now famous pronouncement of "running the country according to law
and establishing a socialist rule of law country." In March 1999, these
words were enshrined in the Constitution by adding them to Article 5.
There is no denying that these changes are significant, but the extent
to which China has adopted, or is in the process of adopting, the rule of law
223 See 1997 CL, art. 109, LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
224 J. CHEN, supra note 12, at 186-87.
225 Two Sentenced for Subverting State, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 22, 1998.
226 Lin & Keith, supra note 3, at 78-79.
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remains controversial. The sentence added to Article 5 of the Constitution,
for example, states, "The People's Republic of China practices ruling the
country by law and constructs a socialist rule of law country." 2 7 This
appears to suggest a coexistence of rule by law and rule of law. In a lecture
to the Party in 1996, Wang Jianfu stated that the rule of law in China was to
be based on three points.22 8 The first point was supremacy of the law, which
required everyone and every organization to obey the law. Second, power
must be based on and exercised within the Constitution and the laws. Third,
everyone must be equal before the law, regardless of status, and no one was
to be above or outside the law. He concluded by noting that an application
of these principles would "counter past resort to [leaders] replacing law with
one's words and 'placing power above law."'
229
There are many aspects of the 1997 CL, the 1996 CPL and the new
laws on judges, procurators, police, lawyers, and administrative penalties
that reflect the adoption of these three points. The prosecution and
execution of high-ranking Party officials for corruption is practical proof
that everyone is equal before the law. On the other hand, certain aspects of
the CL and events since 1997 demonstrate a continuation of state
instrumentalism. Much of the reform in the CL is a direct consequence of
the need to protect the developing socialist market economy, but
maintenance of the new economy is also intrinsically linked to Party policy
on strict social control. This is clearly reflected by the continued use of
severe punishment, including the death penalty, and while this may appear
anomalous to Lin and Keith, it was to be expected.
If there was an expectation within China that the 1997 CL would
"transcend unpredictable political purposes, '231 then the crackdown on the
Falun Gong stands in start contrast to such expectations. The Supreme
Court and Supreme Procuratorate interpretations on cult offenses
criminalize, in very precise terms, the practices of the Falun Gong. The
Chinese position is that they are merely applying Article 300, and thus, that
the prosecution of Falun Gong members is according to the law, but this is
reminiscent of much of the rhetoric used in the anti-crime campaigns. As
such, it reflects Findlay and Chiu's observations concerning the 1989 Law
221 See LAWS OF THE PRC, supra note 1.
228 Lin & Keith, supra note 3, at 83.
229 id.
23 Id. at 85.
31 id. at 82.
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on Assemblies, Processions, and Demonstrations, whereby legality is seen
"as a legitimator for a battery of social control mechanisms. 232
The interpretation is also evidence of the continued influence that the
Communist Party has over the judiciary. While Article 126 of the
Constitution states that the people's courts "are not subject to interference by
any administrative organ, public organisation or individual," this does not
include the Party. In this regard, Liu has documented very clearly how the
Party has used the Supreme Court as a channel through which Party policy is
transmitted to lower courts.
233
Lin and Keith observe, somewhat conditionally, that the criminal law
"might still be understood as a legitimate instrument of state policy, if not as
a tool of state instrumentalism. ''234 On the contrary, and despite the changes
in the 1997 CL, the continuity of policy towards social control leads to the
inevitable conclusion that the CL remains very much an instrument of state
policy and a tool of state instrumentalism. As Gellat has pointed out:
An overarching concern is of course the subservience of the
legal system to the arbitrary dictates of the Communist Party, a
problem that cannot by any means be resolved solely by
reforms within the legal system. Without fundamental political
changes there can be no independent judiciary or an
autonomous bar-key elements of the rule of law.235
Gellat drew this conclusion in 1993, two years before the beginning of
the reform process in 1995.236 These reforms are significant as they affect
China's criminal justice system. They do not, however, represent the
adoption of the rule of law. If they represent progression towards the
adoption of the rule of law in China, which is at least debatable, the
crackdown on the Falun Gong enabled by the Supreme Court interpretation
of October 30, 1999, represents a significant backward step in such progress.
Lubman is also pessimistic about claims concerning the rule of law
and concludes that fundamental changes are required in China before any
232 Findlay & Chor-Wing, supra note 83, at 80.
233 NANPING Liu, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION IN CHINA (1997).
234 Lin & Keith, supra note 3, at 78.
25 TIMOTHY A. GELLATTF, CRIMINAL JUSTICE WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: CHINA'S CRIMINAL
PROCESS AND VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 85 (1993).
236 As noted at the beginning of this article, the major criminal justice reforms since 1995 include the
Police Law (1995), the Judges Law (1995), the Procurators Law (1995), 1996 Criminal Procedure Law
(CPL), the Administrative Penalty Law (1996), and the Criminal Law (1997). See LAWS OF THE PRC,
supra note 1.
JANUARY 2002
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
real notion of a rule of law could be said to exist. 237 In this regard, he goes
as far as to suggest that without such fundamental changes there can be said
to be no 'legal system' in China.238 This is not to say, however, that the
reforms introduced to date are not significant. There has been significant
change, but as Lubman observes, this may have resulted in "the economic
bird escaping its cage," but "the legal bird" remaining firmly locked in its.
239
The cage, in this regard, is the existence of the Party/State and the continued
policy of strict social control. In fact, the liberation of the "economic bird,"
and China's resultant prosperity and economic development, appears to be
seen by those in power as dependent upon a continuity of the policy of strict
social control. The crackdown on the Falun Gong is again symptomatic of
this perception and policy.
237 STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 298-309 (1999).
238 See Ian Dobinson, Stanley B. Lubman's Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China After Mao, 46
CHINA J. 168-69 (2001) (book review).
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